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CONTENTS

The Vatican Council's Unfinished Business
Joseph Clifford Fenton 217

The Biblical Theology on Purgatory *Ernest Lussier, S.S.S.* 225

The Church Offers the Mass: II *John L. Murphy* 234

Cardinals on Trial *Marian Sitzmann, O.S.B.* 247

Mors Mariae, Vita Aeterna *Alfred C. Rush, C.SS.R.* 257

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
John P. McCormick, S.S., and Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R.

Stabat Mater 268

Votive Masses 268

The Gesture at the Orate Fratres 269

What Ordo? 269

Mass Without a Server 270

(Contents Continued on Next Page)

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(Contents continued from previous page)

A Catholic for President 271

Has Error any Rights? 273

BOOK REVIEWS

The Notion of Tradition in John Driedo, *by John L. Murphy* 278

Counselling the Catholic, *by George Hagmaier, C.S.P., and Robert W. Gleason, S.J.* 279

De matrimonio rato et non consummato, *by Josephus Casoria* 280

The Life of Benedict XV, *by Walter H. Peters* 283

The Infant of Prague, *by Ludvick Nemec* 283

The Eucharist and Christian Life, *by Isidor Cardinal Goma, adapted by Aloysius J. Willinger, C.SS.R.* 285

BOOKS RECEIVED 286

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THE VATICAN COUNCIL'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS

On Oct. 20, 1870, in the Apostolic Letter *Postquam Dei munere,* Pope Pius IX suspended the deliberations of the Vatican Council. In this same document the Sovereign Pontiff referred to the accomplishments and to the unfinished business of this august assembly:

> And certainly, during the four public and solemn sessions that were held, Constitutions which were salutary and opportune for the cause of the faith had been published and promulgated by Us, with the same sacred Council approving. Moreover other matters pertaining both to the cause of the faith and to ecclesiastical discipline, which could shortly have been sanctioned and promulgated by the supreme authority of the teaching Church, were submitted for examination by the Fathers [*ad examen a Patribus revocata*]. We were confident that such works could advance, by reason of the common application and zeal of the brotherhood, and that they could be brought to the desired conclusion easily and readily.[1]

Only two Constitutions, both of them doctrinal in content, were actually approved, published, and promulgated by Pope Pius IX as decrees of the Ecumenical Council of the Vatican. They were the dogmatic Constitution *Dei Filius,* which was issued by the Council at its third solemn and public session on April 24, 1870, and which was confirmed, published, and promulgated by Pope Pius IX at that same session, and the dogmatic Constitution *Pastor aeternus,* issued by the Council and confirmed, published, and promulgated by the Pope at the fourth session, on July 18 of that same year.

At the time the Council was suspended, however, several schemata or projects for conciliar constitutions had been submitted to the Fathers of the Council. The original drafts of these schemata were drawn up within the various preparatory commissions of

[1] *Acta et decreta Sacrosancti Oecumenici Concilii Vaticani cum permultis aliis documentis ad Concilium ejusque Historiam Spectantibus,* auctoribus Presbyteris S. J. e domo B.V.M. sine Labe Conceptae ad Lacum (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1892), col. 497 f.

theologians and canonists which had been working on these projects prior to the actual opening of the Council. The schemata themselves were submitted to the Fathers of the Council for consideration with the approval of the Sovereign Pontiff.

By far the most important of these schemata were two doctrinal projects, a *Schema constitutionis dogmaticae de praecipuis mysteriis fidei,* and a *Schema constitutionis dogmaticae de ecclesia Christi.* There were also eleven schemata or projects of a primarily disciplinary or legislative orientation. They were:

(1) A *Schema constitutionis de episcopis, de synodis, et de vicariis generalibus.*

(2) A *Schema constitutionis de sede episcopali vacante.* This was subsequently offered to the Fathers of the Council in an improved form. It was revised and perfected by the members of the *deputatio pro rebus disciplinae ecclesiasticae.*

(3) A *Schema constitutionis de vita et honestate clericorum.*

(4) A *Schema constitutionis de parvo catechismo.* This short project was submitted to the Fathers in three forms: first as it came from the experts of the preparatory commissions, then, as it was perfected and revised by the members of the *deputatio pro rebus disciplinae ecclesiasticae,* and finally, as incorporating the changes and improvements suggested and accepted by the Fathers during the course of the general congregations.

(5) A *Schema constitutionis de oneribus Missarum aliisque piis dispositionibus.*

(6) A *Schema constitutionis de titulis ordinationum.*

(7) A *Schema constitutionis de regularibus.*

(8) A *Schema constitutionis super voto obedientiae.*

(9) A *Schema constitutionis super perfecta vita communi.*

(10) A *Schema constitutionis de clausura.*

(11) A *Schema constitutionis super Missionibus Apostolicis.*

The *Schema constitutionis dogmaticae de praecipuis mysteriis fidei,* the first of the two dogmatic projects on which the Vatican Council would have been expected to act had it been able to continue its deliberations, was in reality an improved form of the second portion of a long dogmatic schema which had been the first project offered for the consideration of the Fathers of the

Council. The original form stood as a *Schema constitutionis dogmaticae de doctrina catholica contra multiplices errores ex rationalismo derivatos.* In its original state it contained eighteen chapters. The four chapters of the Constitution *Dei Filius* contain, in a highly perfected form, the material set forth in the first eleven chapters of the original project. The five chapters of the schema *de praecipuis mysteriis fidei* contain the material presented in the last seven chapters of the original project.

In its original form, the *Schema constitutionis dogmaticae de ecclesia Christi* contained fifteen chapters, the eleventh of which dealt with the primacy of the Roman Pontiff. Later a supplementary chapter on the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff in defining matters of faith and morals was attached to the section on the primacy of the Roman Pontiff. As a result of petitions offered by the members of the majority in the Vatican Council, this body of teaching on the primacy and the infallibility of the Sovereign Pontiff was taken out of its original context and considered before the rest of the material in the schema. This doctrine was incorporated and organized into the dogmatic Constitution *Pastor aeternus,* the second and last dogmatic constitution issued by the Vatican Council.

As it stood at the time the Vatican Council was suspended, the schema *de praecipuis mysteriis fidei* contained five chapters, each with its corresponding canons. The first dealt with the Blessed Trinity, the second with the creation and nature of man, the third with man's elevation and fall, the fourth with the Mystery of the Incarnate Word, and the fifth with the grace of the Redeemer. The schema *de ecclesia Christi* was made up of the following chapters; the eleventh became the basis of the Constitution *Pastor aeternus:*

(1) The Church is the Mystical Body of Christ.

(2) The Christian Religion can be practiced *(excoli posse)* only in and through the Church founded by Christ.

(3) The Church is a true, perfect, spiritual, and supernatural society.

(4) The Church is a visible society.

(5) On the visible unity of the Church.

(6) The Church is a society completely necessary *(omnino necessariam)* for the attainment of salvation.

(7) No one can be saved outside of the Church.

(8) On the Church's indefectibility.

(9) On the Church's infallibility.

(10) On the Church's power.

(11) On the primacy of the Roman Pontiff.

(12) On the temporal dominion of the Holy See.

(13) On the concord between the Church and the civil society.

(14) On the right and use of the civil power according to the teaching of the Catholic Church.

(15) On certain special rights of the Church with relation to the civil society.

Twenty-one canons were appended to the chapters of the projected constitution *de ecclesia Christi.* Only three of these canons contained teaching which was later set forth in the dogmatic constitution *Pastor aeternus.*

The words of the *Postquam Dei munere,* cited at the beginning of this article, show very clearly that Pope Pius IX desired and hoped that the teachings contained in these two projects for dogmatic constitutions would ultimately be issued officially by the Vatican Council and would be confirmed and promulgated by himself. The great Sovereign Pontiff asserted that he was "confident that such works could advance . . . and that they could be brought to the desired conclusion easily and readily."

There is also ample evidence to show that the most important and influential Fathers of the Council were likewise very anxious indeed that these teachings should be issued by the Council itself. Pope Pius IX issued the *Postquam Dei munere,* suspending the Vatican Council indefinitely, only after it had become apparent that, under the conditions then existing, it would have been quite impossible for the Council to have continued its work in Rome. The Sovereign Pontiff did not even advert to any possibility of continuing the assembly in some place other than the Eternal City.

After the issuance of the *Postquam Dei munere,* such a suggestion was made to the Holy See. The author of the suggestion was Martin John Spalding, the Archbishop of Baltimore, and by all means the most important American prelate present at the Vatican Council. He made his suggestion only after having conferred with,

and after having had his suggestion strongly approved by Cardinal Paul Cullen, the Archbishop of Dublin, Henry Edward Manning, the Archbishop of Westminster, and Victor Auguste Dechamps, the Archbishop of Malines.

Two days after the issuance of the Apostolic Letter *Postquam Dei munere,* that is, on Oct. 22, 1870, Archbishop Spalding addressed a letter from London to Cardinal Barnabo, the Prefect of the Sacred Congregation *De Propaganda Fide.* In this letter he suggested the transfer of the Council to the city of Malines in Belgium, and he stated that this suggestion had the wholehearted approval of Cardinal Cullen and of Archbishops Manning and Dechamps. He presented ten reasons which, in his opinion, tended to favor the transfer of the Council to the Belgian city.

(1) The material for most of the schemata was already prepared, and, indeed, some of these schemata were in a condition in which they could very quickly be submitted to the Council in solemn and public session. Archbishop Spalding felt that the Council should be convened again within a short time. Otherwise, he believed, all the work which had been done on these schemata which had not as yet been approved and issued by the Council in public and solemn session would be wasted.

(2) The distinguished Archbishop of Malines not only approved this suggestion, but was ardently desirous that the Council be called together again, this time in his own city. Archbishop Spalding, however, made it clear that Archbishop Dechamps would not offer this suggestion to the Holy See himself.

(3) There was ample accommodation for the meetings of the Council itself, and for living quarters for the Fathers and the officials of the Council in the city of Malines.

(4) Malines was considered easily accessible and sufficiently central, and thus a good location for the continuation of the Council.

(5) The climate of Malines could be considered as better than that of Rome.

(6) It would be possible to continue the work of the Council even during the summer months at Malines.

(7) The Belgian government would not interfere in any way with the works of the Council. That government would consider the calling of the Council in Malines as an honor for the nation.

(8) The population of Malines was predominantly Catholic, and would certainly work to make things pleasant for the Fathers and the officers of the Council.

(9) The cost of living was relatively low in Malines.

(10) Archbishop Spalding believed that the transfer of the Council to Malines would serve as a very practical lesson to the Piedmontese government and to the world. The Piedmont regime promised liberty, but, as a matter of fact, it made a prisoner of the Sovereign Pontiff and, by its actions, had rendered the continuance of the Council in Rome impossible. By the transfer to the Belgian city, the Church could show all men where true liberty, as contrasted with its counterfeit, was to be found.[2]

The Archbishop of Baltimore asked Cardinal Barnabo to refer his suggestion to the Holy Father if this should appear proper. There seems to be no record of any actual decision being taken on this matter.

Yet it is important to realize that the suggestion was actually made, and that it was supported by such distinguished Fathers of the Vatican Council. It is likewise important to realize that Archbishop Spalding's suggestion was ultimately based upon a conviction that the completion of the Vatican Council's unfinished business would have been greatly advantageous to the Catholic Church. That same conviction is expressed by Pope Pius IX in the *Postquam Dei munere* itself.

It is quite obvious that the disciplinary decrees which were in the process of preparation at the time the Council was suspended would have been definitely helpful to the Church of that day. These schemata embodied improvements in the ecclesiastical legislation of the day. And, actually, the subsequent pontifical legislation, particularly the Code of Canon Law, owed a great deal to the discussions and the decisions of the men who drew up these disciplinary schemata.

Likewise it is very easy to see why both the Sovereign Pontiff and leading Fathers of the Vatican Council should have been convinced that great benefit would accrue to the Church through the

[2] Cf. Granderath-Kirch, *Histoire du Concile du Vatican depuis sa première annonce jusqu'à sa prorogation d'après les documents authentiques* (Brussels: Librairie Albert Dewit, 1913), III, 2nd part, 186-89.

issuance of dogmatic constitutions embodying at least some of the matter contained in the two unfinished doctrinal schemata. The evidence in this direction is particularly compelling with regard to the content of the schema on the Church of Christ. But it is also adequate with reference to what was set down in the schema on the principal mysteries of the faith.

As a matter of fact a great deal of the material stated or implied in the *schema constitutionis dogmaticae de ecclesia Christi* has been taught authoritatively to the universal Church since the suspension of the Vatican Council, through various pontifical pronouncements, and particularly through the medium of encyclical letters. Probably the most important single statement along this line was that of Pope Pius XII's famed encyclical, the *Mystici Corporis Christi,* which was issued June 29, 1943. It set forth authoritatively, clearly, and powerfully the basic truth contained in the first chapter of the projected dogmatic constitution of the Church of Christ. Very definitely the cause of Catholic theology would have benefited immensely from a dogmatic assertion by the Vatican Council that the Roman Catholic Church is actually the Mystical Body of Christ.

May we expect that the forthcoming ecumenical council will take up again the teachings contained in the two doctrinal schemata which the First Vatican Council would have acted upon had it been allowed to complete its deliberations? There is, of course, no way of answering this question definitely at the present moment. In the final analysis, the forthcoming ecumenical council will deal with matters submitted to it by the Sovereign Pontiff. He alone has the authority to decide and to designate the subjects the council is to treat and to decide and designate the order in which the council will deal with these matters.

In order to aid him in this task, he has called upon the bishops of the entire Catholic world to offer their suggestions as to what may be treated most profitably in this most august assembly. He has likewise called for suggestions from the various pontifical universities and faculties scattered throughout the Catholic world. But, in the last analysis, the decision must be his and his alone.

There does, however, seem to be some probability that the forthcoming council will ultimately be called upon to deal with a dogmatic constitution about the Church of Christ. It does not seem likely that an ecumenical council held within this decade would

close its sessions without presenting, in the most solemn manner in which the Church can act, some of the striking and salvific truths about the true Church which have been taught in the encyclical letters of the Roman Pontiffs since the closing of the Vatican Council. Thus there is a good chance that some, at least, of the unfinished doctrinal business of the Vatican Council may ultimately be brought to completion by the next ecumenical council.

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THE BIBLICAL THEOLOGY ON PURGATORY

Because of the progress in Biblical science, there is an obvious work of revision that must yet be done in regard to our theological manuals. Among all the theological treatises, Eschatology is certainly one that would require even drastic revisions from the Biblical viewpoint.[1] What we intend to present here is a discussion of how the Biblical argument for the existence of Purgatory might be so revised.

The pseudo-reformers of the sixteenth century were characterized by their bitter attacks against the Catholic doctrine on Purgatory, as is well known.[2] The blasphemous vituperations typical of the early Protestant literature were evidently a poor substitute for prudent reasoning.[3] A favorite argument at the time was the application of the so-called "Biblical principle," and the consequent denial that Purgatory has any Scriptural background.

This assertion was considered important enough by Pope Leo X for him to condemn the following proposition of Luther: "Purgatory cannot be proven from Sacred Scripture that is canonical."[4] Luther, of course, and the first Protestants rejected the two books of the Machabees from the Canon, thinking thus that a killing blow was delivered to the Catholic doctrine of Purgatory.[5] Thus we must point out from the start that even if there were nothing in the Bible to justify the doctrine on Purgatory, the essential Catholic teaching on the question would still be legitimate, since it is a necessary corollary of several other theological treatises, e.g. that on the attributes of God, the nature of sanctifying grace, the need of penance and satisfaction, and the like. Such, however, is not the case; the doctrine of Purgatory is solidly based on Scripture.

[1] Cf. *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, 1950, pp. 243-247.

[2] *Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1928), IV, col. 498.

[3] E.g., *ibid.*, col. 501, 502; *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1936), XIII, col. 1270.

[4] Denz., 777.

[5] Pirot, *La Sainte Bible* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1951), vol. VIII, 2e partie, p. 218.

We are thinking here of Purgatory as a *state,* as described in the official Church definitions.[6] We intend to exclude any more speculative questions, such as the place where Purgatory is, the nature of the purgatorial flames or of the suffrages for the deceased. Our approach, moreover, will be strictly *exegetical,* leaving aside most of the historical and even patristic material. Exegetical interpretation as practiced here deals especially with the philology and the analogy of Biblical faith, that is, the Biblical pattern of divine revelation. To put it briefly, it is limited to the text and context.

We hold that the doctrine of Purgatory is contained *implicitly* but formally in *II Mach.* 12:43-46 and *I Cor.* 3:10-17. We feel that other texts frequently quoted (*Ecclus.* 7:37; *Matt.* 5:25-26, 12:32; *Luke* 12:58-59) are completely inoperative. The implicit, as we conceive it, is the full understanding of what is contained in the sacred writers' assertions, and should in no way be confused with the "consequent sense" of Scripture, which is not formally revealed but only virtually.[7]

Some theologians, arguing from the statement of Trent,[8] have recently criticized a strictly exegetical approach to Bible interpretation, holding that the only way a Catholic should interpret Scripture is in the light of Patristic tradition. The application of this principle, however, is limited, and serves more in the nature of a guide than a source.[9] Sound exegesis, like credibility in relation to the act of faith, precedes the official Church interpretations of Scripture. In any case, our restriction here is simply pedagogical and academic. We are convinced because of educated soundings that our exegesis finds serious historical and patristic support.

We might also note that some apologists, in spite of their good intentions, create false problems in this question instead of solving real ones.[10] Some do this, by apparently suggesting that the Catholic

[6] Denz., 983, 998.

[7] Cf. Hopfl-Leloir, *Introductio generalis in sacram scripturam* (Neapoli: M. D'Auria, 1958), p. 431.

[8] Denz., 786.

[9] Cf. Renié, *Manuel d'Écriture Sainte* (Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1949), vol. 1, No. 156.

[10] Cf., e.g., Pamphlet No. 28 published by the Knights of Columbus, 4422 Lindell Blvd., St. Louis 8, Missouri: *Let us Judge Catholics by the Bible,* pp. 28-31; Edward A. Mangan, *Answers to Favorite Bible Questions* (Liguorian Pamphlets, Liguori, Missouri), p. 45.

doctrine on Purgatory is based uniquely on *II Machabees;* others—and they are perhaps the occasion of greater disservice—do so by quoting as proofs texts that have nothing to do with the notion of Purgatory. A recent book may illustrate the point.[11] At the word "Purgatory" we find the following entries as biblical evidence of the teaching: *II Mach.* 12:43-46; *Ecclus.* 7:37; *Matt.* 5:25-26, 12:32; *Luke* 12:58-59; *I Cor.* 13-15; *Peter* 3:18-20. It is apparently supposed that *II Machabees* is special, since the other texts are introduced with the words "alluded to or implied." And finally, we are told to compare *Matt.* 12:36 with *Apoc.* 21:27.

In this regard, we might note that the sixteenth century Catholic apologists, like Bellarmine and Eck, in their zeal for the refutation of their Protestant adversaries, sometimes quoted Biblical texts which have no relation to Purgatory.[12]

At the death of Saul (*I Kings* 31:13; cf. *II Kings* 1:12 and 3:35), the people fasted for seven days as a sign of general mourning. Bellarmine argued that the purpose of the fast was to help the deceased. That such is not the idea should be self-evident, even without referring to *II Kings* 12:23, which underlines the small comfort afforded the living by fasting.

So also *Tobias* 4:18, which refers to funereal banquets celebrated in memory of the dead for the consolation of the mourners. Bellarmine claimed that the meals were given to the poor to make them pray for the departed. The meaning, however, is the same as in *Jer.* 16:7, where the prophet foretells that joyful assemblies and mourning rites will soon cease in presence of the great calamity which will strike the people.

Ecclus. 7:33 (Vulg. 37) insists that the dead should be honored by proper mourning and burial, an idea that recurs constantly in the preceding books (cf. *II Kings* 21:10-14; *Jer.* 22:19; *Is.* 34:3; *Tobias* 1:17-18; 12:12). It is only later (*II Mach.* 12:38-46) that people will think of offering prayers and sacrifices for the deceased.[13] It is then anachronistic to suggest that *Ecclus.* 7:33 should be read in the light of the Machabean text.[14]

[11] Cf. William J. Kiefer, *Biblical Subject Index* (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1958), p. 145.

[12] Cf. *DTC, loc. cit.,* col. 1165.

[13] Cf. *La Sainte Bible de Jérusalem* (Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1958), p. 903.

[14] Ita, *The Holy Bible,* Confraternity edition, vol. 3, The Sapiential Books (Paterson, N. J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1955), p. 547.

In the Old Testament, there is actually only one text implying an intermediate state where the souls of the departed are purified and receive help in their satispassion from the suffrages of the living: what has come to be known as Purgatory; this is the text from *II Mach.* 12:38-46.[15] The true importance of this text in the progressive revelation of eschatology has seldom been sufficiently emphasized. Actually, this passage points the direction taken by divine Providence in the revelation of Purgatory, namely by way of suffrages for the dead.

The epitomizer of Jason of Cyrene's chronicles of the Machabean wars (*II Mach.* 2:19-32) evidently considered such suffrages efficacious (*II Mach.* 12:43-44), a fact which obviously supposes the need and possibility of somehow satisfying even after death for the punishment due for sin. On this point of the possibility and utility of suffrages, prayers, and sacrifices for the dead, it is interesting and *essential* to note that Catholic tradition is constant and monotonously universal.[16] Thus we find a comforting convergence between our two sources of revelation: Scripture stating the fact in our pericope, and tradition repeating it as a glorious chorus throughout the ages.

The exegesis of *II Mach.* 12:38-46 is without serious difficulty. It should suffice here to focus our attention on some points which need clarification, since they are often ignored or misrepresented.

Judas mentions the *resurrection* of his soldiers, but subordinates it to the expiation in the after-life of the sin they have committed. This expiation will be obtained by the prayers (v. 42) and the sacrifice offered (v. 43). After their resurrection, the soldiers will receive their reward, clearly an individual retribution (v. 45).[17]

The thought of the resurrection is evidently in the foreground here and needs some elucidation. The Hebrew mind did not clearly distinguish as we do between the body and the soul, so that the primitive notion of survival after earthly life included the idea of the resurrection of the body. This is as close as the Hebrew thought came to the abstract idea of immortality, before its contact with Greek philosophy. We finally will note this idea of immortality de-

[15] Cf. *La Sainte Bible de Jérusalem,* p. 588.

[16] Cf. A. Michel, *The Last Things* (St. Louis: Herder), p. 99; *DTC,* XIV, col. 2737.

[17] Cf. *La Sainte Bible de Jérusalem,* p. 588.

veloped without reference to the resurrection of the body by Jews familiar with Greek philosophical notions; *Wis.* 3:1-5, 13 is one witness of this.[18]

It should not be necessary to point out, of course, that the "godliness" (*eusebias:* v. 45) is not specifically sanctifying grace, but rather love of religion and of country.

We might also notice that in this incident, the sin (v. 42) is clearly not of the kind which has come to be known as "mortal sin." There is no question in the hagiographer's mind that the suffrages offered were efficacious, and to suppose that he approves (*II Mach.* 12:43-44) of the notion that serious sins can be remitted in the next life is surely contrary to the analogy of Biblical faith and without support in the text. Even if we suppose, as seems to be the case, that the idolatrous objects taken from the temple at Jamnia (v. 40) were being used as amulets, this would be so; money or valuables would normally be carried in one's cincture, not under the tunic.

Notice, finally, how the episode shows that the belief expressed by Judas Machabeus and sanctioned by the sacred writer was widespread at the time in Israel. Judas acts with the co-operation of all those who contributed to the sum of money raised for the sacrifice, and it is to be presumed that the priests who offered the sacrifice also shared the same belief.[19]

SOME NEW TESTAMENT TEXTS

The so-called "penny text" (*Matt.* 5:25-26; cf. *Luke* 12:58-59) is unfortunately not worth one theological penny, even as an indirect proof for Purgatory. The passage is an implicit parable; it clearly refers to God's judgment, but simply underlines the severity with which our faults against charity will be judged. The metaphor is that of a private settlement in preference to a court trial which would be conducted according to rigorous justice. Nothing is said of the possibility or impossibility of payment being made in prison. The passage is highly metaphorical, and metaphors are not to be pressed.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 580.

[19] Cf. Sutcliffe, *The Old Testament and the Future Life* (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1947), p. 124.

Matt. 12:32 is presented by most theologians and even by some Biblicists as clearly suggesting the existence of Purgatory.[20] Unfortunately such is not the case. The pericope deals with the sins against the Holy Spirit which of their nature are irremissible, since they are deliberate sins against the light, a voluntary and categorical rejection of God's law. St. Matthew uses a current Jewish phrase, "this world and the next," as an emphatic periphrase for "never." That such is his meaning should be evident when one examines the parallel passages of Mark and Luke, who, since they are writing for Gentiles, avoid the Semitic expression. *Mark* 3:29, in fact, says clearly that the person guilty of such a sin "never has forgiveness, but will be guilty of an everlasting sin"; and *Luke* 12:10 says categorically that the sin "will not be forgiven."

We cannot therefore safely argue that because Matthew says that this sin will not be forgiven in the age to come, there are therefore sins which *will* be forgiven then. That may or may not be true, but it cannot be deduced from the form of St. Matthew's expression. On the other hand, neither is it implied in any way that these serious sins are not forgiven in the next world because only venial sins are then pardoned.

The comparison of *Matt.* 12:36 and *Apoc.* 21:27 suggested by Kiefer will prove completely fruitless.[21] *I Peter* 3:18-20, which he also quotes, mentions Christ's descent into the abode of the dead to announce the joyful news of His resurrection, and has no reference to Purgatory.

However, a difficult text from *I Corinthians* 15:29 relative to the baptism for the dead probably supposes the doctrine of Purgatory, but is usually passed unnoticed. Actually, the allusion is probably to a non-sacramental rite meant to express the baptism of desire of a deceased catechumen, and intended as a suffrage in his favor.[22]

Practically all Catholic commentators see in *I Cor.* 3:10-17 a solid foundation for the doctrine of Purgatory, although much in

[20] Cf. *DTC*, 1936, XIII, col. 1170-1171; Lusseau-Collomb, *Manuel d'études bibliques* (Paris: Téqui, 1938), vol. IV, p. 466; Renié, *Manuel d'Écriture Sainte* (Paris: Vitte, 1948), vol. IV, No. 315; Steinmueller, *Catholic Biblical Encyclopedia: New Testament* (New York: Wagner, 1949), p. 534.

[21] Cf. supra, *loc. cit.*, note 11.

[22] Allo, *Première Épître aux Corinthiens* (Paris: Gabalda, 1934), p. 413.

their individual presentation might be open to serious contention.[23] This portion of St. Paul's letter (3:5-4:5) deals with the nature of the Apostolate. In 3:9 the Apostle passes from his agricultural metaphor to that of building. Verses 10 to 17 insist on the responsibility of preachers.

St. Paul, like a wise builder, has laid the only foundation possible: Christ. Those who build thereon must remember that their work will be severely tested by God's judgment. The different materials used symbolize the unequal value of the doctrines taught by the Corinthian preachers. Gold, silver, precious stones represent solid and fruitful doctrines. Wood, hay, straw do not signify errors or heresies, since they really serve in building; but they represent flimsy materials such as frivolous teachings, useless stories, light ramblings that have little influence for good; one might almost say from a practical viewpoint badly prepared sermons.

As for the "day of the Lord" mentioned by St. Paul, even if we grant that he has exclusively the *Parousia* in mind, the conclusion will always be the same, namely that some purgation is implied for sins which do not absolutely exclude from the enjoyment of heaven.

[23] Cornely, *Prior Epistola ad Corinthios* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1909), p. 91; Callan, *The Epistles of St. Paul* (New York: Wagner, 1922), vol. 1, p. 292; Bernard, *Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1928), vol. IV, col. 504; Prat, *Theology of St. Paul* (London: Burns Oates, 1936), vol. 1, p. 96; Allo, *Première Épître aux Corinthiens* (Paris: Gabalda, 1934), pp. 63, 66-67; Michel, *DTC*, 1936, vol. XIII, col. 1174-1179; Confraternity, *The New Testament* (Paterson, N. J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1941), p. 451; Osty, *Les Épîtres de Saint Paul* (Paris: Siloé, 1945), p. 88; Huby, *Première Épître aux Corinthiens, Verbum Salutis* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1946), p. 112; Renié, *Manuel d'Ecriture Sainte* (Paris: Vitte, 1948), vol. 6, no. 128; Steinmueller, *Catholic Biblical Encyclopedia: New Testament* (New York: Wagner, 1949), p. 534; Crampon-Tricot, *La Sainte Bible* (Paris: Desclée, 1952), p. 189; Orchard, etc., *A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture* (New York: Nelson, 1953), p. 1087, no. 871e; Lienart, *La Sainte Bible* (Paris: Siloé, 1955), p. 1323; *La Sainte Bible de Jérusalem* (Paris: Cerf, 1958), p. 1513; Pontificio Istituto Biblico, *La Sacra Bibbia* (Firenze: Salani, 1958), vol. IX, p. 147. . . . Some authors, however, refuse to see here any reference to Purgatory: Spicq, Épîtres aux Corinthiens, *La Sainte Bible*, ed. Pirot-Clamer (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1949), tome XI, 2e partie, p. 195; also Gnilka in a work mentioned by Viard in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 40 (1956), 155, and by Collins in *Theological Studies*, 17 (1956), 541. Collins, however, notes that "most Catholic authors" think otherwise.

A theologian would say that the text implies some satispassion after the judgment—which is equivalently what we mean by Purgatory.

This conclusion, however, will be stronger if, as many believe, the "day" is the day of judgment, without specification (cf. *I Cor.* 4:3). This will, of course, include the *Parousia,* but before that time, Christ exercises His judgment in many ways (which are probably also meant here, although they are not clearly specified).[24]

The "reward" (v. 14) is not eternal life, but a special recompense—what the theologian would call "merit." This should be clear from the fact that the negligent preacher is saved in spite of his loss of the reward. We may even safely argue from this same contrast that the negligent preacher's punishment is due to "demerit," ultimately to what the theologian would call the "temporal punishment due to sin." This is an argument from the context which, as shall be stressed later, is not to be neglected in the interpretation of this passage.

The "fire" is not the fire of hell, since one is saved even after having experienced it. Nor is it the "fire of Purgatory," since it affects all the preachers indiscriminately. Some think of the fire of the would-be "final conflagration." There is nothing in Scripture, however, to show that the earth will undergo a conflagration at the time of the *Parousia.*[25] The fire, then, as is usually true in the Bible, is the "fire of God's judgment" (*II Thess.* 1:8), a purifying flame, according to a frequent Biblical symbolism (cf. *Is.* 1:25; 6:7; *Zach.* 13:9; *Matt.* 3:2-3; *Ecclus.* 2:5; *Matt.* 3:11). Some authors believe that St. Paul's metaphor supposes a mere appreciation or manifestation of the works of the negligent preacher,[26] but that seems less agreeable to the Biblical usage quoted above, and contrary to the context which clearly suggests *purification.* The manner of this purification is not specified, but that is unimportant. The fact is what matters.

The negligent preacher will suffer the mortification of having labored in vain, but that is not all. He will be saved, but not without pain and distress, *not without being singed,* to use St. Paul's

[24] Cf. Allo, *loc. cit.,* p. 61.

[25] Lussier, "The Universal Conflagration at the Parousia," *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly,* 1950, pp. 243-247.

[26] E.g., Spicq, *loc. cit.,* p. 195.

own metaphor; like someone surprised by a sudden conflagration, who saves himself by rushing through the flames, but not without minor burns as well as fear and horror.

This exegesis is strongly confirmed by the preceding context if —as many believe—*zēmiōthēsetai* (v. 15) does not mean simply "to lose one's reward," but "to be punished." [27]

An argument can also be drawn from the following context (vv. 16-17), in which St. Paul mentions the saboteurs who destroy God's temple: i.e., the believing soul. They are menaced with definitive ruin, clearly everlasting punishment: hell. Here the background is evidently eschatological, and must give some similar coloring to what has preceded.

Finally, what is said of the negligence of preachers applies also to all other venial sins.

All these explanations of the text and context, immediate and remote, bring out, we believe, the *formal* meaning *implicitly* intended by St. Paul.

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[27] Arndt-Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 339.

THE CHURCH OFFERS THE MASS

II

In the first section of this article we treated a number of fundamental questions which must serve as a basis for all discussion of the manner in which the entire Church offers the Sacrifice of the Mass.[1] Chief among them is the fact that in the New Testament era there is but one Sacrifice—that of Christ; hence the Sacrifice of the Church must be essentially identified with that unique Sacrifice. In addition, it was noted as important that the sacrificial life of the Church be viewed in regard to the virtue of religion.

With these general notions in mind, we may proceed to a more particularized answer to the question raised at the start: "In what manner does the Church offer the Sacrifice of the Mass?"

We must emphasize first of all that the Church is a unique body —a moral body, plus certain supernatural elements; this fact alone places the Church in a class apart. It is a group of people who are intimately united to Christ, and who can not only *live* this special life, but who can also *act* in accordance with it. The life of the Church is not only static but dynamic; it is operative, and thus flows forth in actions.

This is, in reality, a further application of the theandric nature of the Church, just as the Church is an outgrowth of the life and work of Christ: His extension in time and space. As Bluett points out: "This Headship of the theandric Redeemer . . . is the core, the central truth of ecclesiology. Apart from it, nothing else in the Church can be understood for what it really is."[2]

Thus, just as the Church itself is the extension of Christ in time and space, so also is the Mass the extension of Christ's sacrifice in time and space. It pertains, in a special manner, to the entire Church. In a certain sense, the prerogative of infallibility belongs

[1] Cf. *AER*, CXLII (1960), 164 ff.

[2] Joseph Bluett, "The Theological Significance of the Encyclical 'Mystici Corporis'," *Proceedings, The Catholic Theological Society of America* (1946), p. 55. Cf. Murphy, *The Mass and Liturgical Reform*, pp. 14, 17, 62, 67, 71, 182, 187, 189, 256; and Murphy, *The Living Christ* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956), pp. 206 ff.

to the Church, or the mission to teach or to forgive sins. All of these activities are proper to certain members of the Church; they alone can perform the precise actions indicated. Nevertheless, all of these activities are attributed to the entire Church, i.e., to all the members.

In this way, although it is an individual priest who recites the words of absolution, we do say that the "Church absolves" the sinner. Likewise, the individual bishop teaches, but we say also that the "Church teaches." Again, the *ex cathedra* decision of the Pope is not his personal decree, but a decree of the Church of Christ. It is issued by the Pope personally, by his individual act; but it is a decree issued in the name of the Church. It touches upon the belief of the entire community, and this belief itself reflects the infallibility of the Church. There is a certain "infallibility in believing" associated with the life of Christ's Church—a secondary type of infallibility, dependent upon the authority of the authentic teachers of that body, but a true concept nonetheless.[3] In other words, there is no public act performed in the Church that is nothing more than a private, individual activity. Such actions are always performed in the name of the universal Church.

In speaking of the role of the faithful in the Mass, however, we enter even more intimately into the inner nature of the Mystical Body. Far more than in these other instances, the faithful are actually associated with the action of the priest. The Mass is, of its very nature, a social act, offered not only in the name of all, but in a proper sense *by all the members* of the Mystical Body. While we could not say that the faithful "teach" or "absolve," yet we can in the truest sense of the word say that the faithful "offer" the Sacrifice of the Mass. We must be very careful to point out that they do not simply "belong" to a Church that sacrifices. Quite the contrary, they are, by virtue of their membership in that Body, able to participate in the Sacrifice of the Church itself. This is true basically because of the baptismal character.

There are two elements we might emphasize here in regard to the baptismal character: (1) its unitive force; and (2) its relationship to Christian worship.

[3] We have treated of this concept briefly in: Murphy, *The Notion of Tradition in John Driedo* (Milwaukee: Seraphic Press, 1959), pp. 269 ff.

It would seem that it is the baptismal character primarily that establishes one as a member of the Mystical Body, and thus makes it possible at all for one to be a part of the *"ecclesia sacrificans."* Baptism does not simply liberate one from sin and bestow grace; it makes one first of all a member of Christ's Church upon earth, and thus through membership in that Church does one receive grace. This is, again, a restatement of that other central truth of ecclesiology: *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus.* It is through and by the Church that the grace of Christ comes to its members.[4]

At the same time, the baptismal character involves a certain ordering towards worship. St. Thomas emphasizes especially the role of Baptism as the gateway to the other sacraments.[5] But by this, the faithful are enabled to share in the Sacrifice of the Church. It is only because a person is baptized that he is able to share actively in the Sacrifice of the Mass. The unbaptized man could attend the Mass and understand it perfectly; he might even take part in the outward ceremonial, the hymns, the prayers. As a personal response to the ceremony, he might be moved to unite himself entirely with the action of the celebrant. He lacks, however, the ontological basis which would permit him to act as a member of the Church in this regard. He lacks, that is, the baptismal character itself. Hence he could not be a co-offerer or co-victim of this Sacrifice, no matter how perfect his external attention or participation.

Moreover, those members who are to be ordained and thus sealed with the mark of Holy Orders, are capable of receiving this sacrament only insofar as they are somehow related to the visible Church by reason of their baptismal character.

Generally speaking, such men will be chosen from among those who are actually members of Christ's Church; this is as God intended it. Their entire life as priests is to be an instrument of Christ in the service of the Church. Thus the Church will act through them. The very concept of "priesthood" involves a social note, for the priest is one chosen from among men—and in the Christian

[4] Cf. Billot, *De ecclesia Christi* (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1927) I, 288 ff.: Thesis X: "Id quod primo et principaliter requiritur ut quis sit Ecclesiae membrum, est character baptismalis, isque non putative tantum, sed in rei veritate susceptus." Also, Murphy, *The Living Christ* (2nd and revised edition, 1956), pp. 105-123.

[5] III, q. 63, art. 6.

era, from among baptized men—in order to represent them before God.[6]

This relationship to the visible Church is so basic that we must conclude that even the priest who is no longer a member of the Church nevertheless offers the Sacrifice in the name of the one, true Church of Christ. The priest who leaves the Church of Rome simply cannot "take his priesthood and his Mass with him," as it were. He necessarily remains an instrument of Christ, the Head of the Church, whenever he offers the Sacrifice of the Mass. Hence he also offers it in the name of the true Church. We cannot identify "membership" with this deputation to act in the name of Christ precisely as the Head of the Church; this is something linked to the indelible character of the sacrament of Holy Orders.

Closely allied to this is the distinction between "member" and "subject" of the Church, which is also associated with the baptismal character.[7] An individual who is baptized a Catholic and who later loses membership in that Church (by reason of heresy, schism, or the status of *excommunicatus vitandus*) nevertheless remains a *subject* of the Church. The relationship to the Church involved in the sacramental character is so deep that he cannot cut himself off, nor be cut off, entirely from the authority of the true Church.

For this reason, a priest who has left the Church will still act as a minister of that Church when he offers the Sacrifice of the Mass, despite the fact that he is no longer a member of the Mystical Body. We have something of the same nature in the case of a priest who has lost membership in the Church, but who absolves someone in

[6] Cf. De Broglie, *Nouvelle revue théologique, loc. cit.*, pp. 451 ff. De Broglie first of all rejects what he terms "le mirage de la 'délégation'," and then goes on to point out the more profound reasons for the essential relationship between priest and community.

[7] Cf. Murphy, *The Living Christ*, p. 100; Coronata, *Institutiones iuris canonici* (Taurini: Marietti, 1939) I, 132 (No. 119); Zapelena, *De ecclesia Christi* (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1954) II, 396 (No. 10); *Idem*, 1940 edition, pp. 146, 149; De Guibert, *De Christi ecclesia* (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1928), p. 147 (No. 184). In our opinion, this concept of "subject" is quite adequate for explaining the relationship of baptized non-members to the Church. In this regard, we fail to see the cogency of Bender's arguments for suggesting a two-fold manner of understanding the term "member." Cf. Ludovicus Bender, "Persona in ecclesia," *Studia in honorem Francisci Roberti, J. B. Montini, H. J. Cicognani* (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis, 1959), pp. 105-119.

case of necessity. He is still acting as an instrument of Christ, and in this case, he also acts in the name of the Church at Mass; but he himself is still not a member of that Church.

The same thing would be true of the priest born and raised in a schismatic sect. By valid baptism, he either acquired membership in the Church of Rome as an infant and later lost it when, upon reaching the age of reason, he freely adhered to the teachings of the schismatic group; or, if baptized as an adult, he acquired the status of a "subject" of the Church of Rome by reason of the baptismal character, without ever being a member of that body.

In either instance, it is because of his baptismal character (and the relationship to the Church—not of membership, but of subject—that it implies) that he is at all capable of validly receiving the sacramental character of Holy Orders from a validly consecrated bishop. Unless he has at least this radical, sacramental relationship to the Church, he cannot even validly receive the sacrament of Holy Orders.

The individual so ordained, however, does not become a "member" of the Church of Rome by reason of his ordination, and yet he is thereby empowered to act as the instrument of Christ, the Head of the Mystical Body. Hence he necessarily acts in the name of the one, true Church as well. When he offers the Sacrifice of the Mass, it is actually the Mass of that Church, the Church of Rome. It cannot be the Mass proper to the schismatic sect, since the sect has lost the vital relationship to Christ included in the notion of the Mystical Body of Christ. It is a valid Mass, but it is a Mass of the Church of Rome, the only true Church. It is this Church which "offers" the Sacrifice, even when the sacrificial action is performed by a validly ordained priest who is not a member of the Body of Christ.

Similarly, the baptized members of a schismatic sect are able to receive the Sacrament of the Eucharist consecrated in such a Mass, and from this they may derive even the sacramental graces, provided they are in good faith. Yet, not being *members* of that Church established by Christ and which is essentially related to the Sacrifice of the Mass, they are not able to offer this Mass by the hands of the priest and in union with him. The same thing is true of baptized Protestants. The fact of baptism alone does not suffice for this. They can receive benefits from this Sacrifice, but

the unitive effect of their baptismal character has been impeded by schism or heresy (even material schism or heresy); hence their relationship to this Sacrifice as a central act of Christian worship has also been impeded. This is, therefore, one of the reasons for a continued desire on the part of the Church of Rome to draw these schismatic and heretical groups back to the true fold, that the Mass might become for the faithful of those sects the "act of offering" that it is for the members of the one, true Church.

As Vonier explains: "We cannot give the Eucharistic sacrifice a scope wider than the Church, because it is the Church only that offers it, and she offers it as her own gift. The sacrifice of the cross belongs to the whole world, but the Eucharistic sacrifice belongs to the Church only." [8]

It is also important to note that the power of representing the members of the Mystical Body does not come from the Church—neither from the Pope or bishops, nor from the laity. It comes from Christ alone. We may not conceive of the priest in any way as a "delegate" of the faithful in this instance, charged by them to act in their name in offering up their Sacrifice.[9] Quite the con-

[8] Vonier, *A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist,* p. 228. Vonier further notes: pp. 228, 229: "It is of supreme importance in this part of theology to avoid passing beyond the limits of divine institution. . . . The sacrifice of the Mass is as much a gift to the children of the Church and as exclusive a gift, as, say, the sacrament of penance. . . ." Also, De Broglie, *Nouvelle revue théologique, loc. cit.,* p. 451, note 4, where he notes that, at the Last Supper, the Apostles could "assist" at the Sacrifice, they could "benefit" from it; but not being as yet members of the visible Church, they could not in any way "offer" that Sacrifice together with Christ. The same, it appears, is true of those who may attend the Sacrifice of the Mass, but who are not members of the Mystical Body of Christ: they cannot in any way "offer" the Mass together with Christ through the ordained priest who acts as the instrument of Christ. This would include baptized Protestants and Schismatics, and not only the unbaptized. The priest—even the schismatic priest—acts for the Church by acting as the instrument of the Head of that Church; this "Church," however, can be only the one, true Church, since Christ is Mystic Head of no other.

[9] To say this would imply, once again, that there is a "sacrifice of the Church" that takes its rise from the Christian community itself, as though it proceeds from their personal initiative. It remains difficult to relate such an approach to the uniqueness of Christ's Sacrifice in the New Testament era, and to the essentially relative nature of the Mass.

trary, the Church—the people—reach the ordained priest through Christ. As Pius XII explains:

> Now it is clear that the faithful offer the Sacrifice by the hands of the priest from the fact that the minister at the altar, in offering a Sacrifice in the name of all His [Christ's] members, represents Christ, the Head of the Mystical Body; hence the whole church can rightly be said to offer up the Victim through Christ.[10]

Accordingly, Pius XII clearly rejects the teaching of those who would portray the celebrant as the delegate of the community in offering Sacrifice:

> For there are today, Venerable Brethren, those who . . . assert that the people are possessed of true priestly power, while the priest only acts in virtue of an office committed to him by the community. . . . But we deem it necessary to recall that the priest acts for the people only because he represents Jesus Christ, who is Head of all His members and offers Himself in their stead. Hence, he goes to the altar as the minister of Christ, inferior to Christ but superior to the people.[11]

This is ultimately the reason why the Mass is also described as the sacrifice that "necessarily and of its very nature has always and everywhere the character of a public and social act, inasmuch as he who offers it acts in the name of Christ and of the faithful, whose Head is the divine Redeemer. . . ." [12] The Sacrifice of the Mass cannot help being a social act, the Sacrifice of the entire community; it is so by its very nature. This social character of the eucharistic Sacrifice is not constituted by the delegation, the presence, the approval, or the active (external) participation of the laity. Thus, whether the faithful are actually present or not, the Mass is always a social act.[13] Because of this, the Instruction of the Congregation of Rites issued in 1958 directs that "the expression 'private Mass' should, then, be avoided." [14]

[10] *Mediator Dei,* pargh. 93.

[11] *Mediator Dei,* parghs. 83, 84.

[12] *Mediator Dei,* pargh. 96.

[13] *Mediator Dei,* pargh. 96: "This [social character] is undoubtedly so, whether the faithful are present . . . or are not present, since it is in no wise required that the people ratify what the sacred Minister has done."

[14] *Sacred Music and Sacred Liturgy* (NCWC edition), pargh. 2: "The Holy Sacrifice of the Mass is an act of public worship offered to God in the name of Christ and the Church, wherever or in whatever manner it is celebrated. The expression 'private Mass' should, then, be avoided."

Active (external) participation, therefore, simply *gives expression* to the social nature of the Mass. Such participation is to be desired in all its forms, but Pius XII emphasized that they are not essential:

> These methods of participation in the Mass are to be approved and commended when they are in complete agreement with the precepts of the Church and the rubrics of the Liturgy. . . . However, though they show also in an outward manner that the very nature of the Sacrifice, as offered by the Mediator between God and men, must be regarded as the act of the whole Mystical Body of Christ, still they are by no means necessary to constitute it a public act or to give it a social character.[15]

It is the essential relationship of the celebrant to Christ, and the relationship of the faithful to their divine Head that makes it possible for them to act through the ordained priest. Neither delegation by the community nor active participation establish the ordained minister as "their priest."

As explained in *Mediator Dei,* there are two ways in which the faithful may be said to "offer" the Sacrifice of the Mass: (1) They offer it *by* the hands of the priest; (2) They offer it *in union with* the priest. Both of these elements must be discussed separately.[16]

There is a preliminary point that must be emphasized, however. In his discussion of this matter, Pius XII introduced an extremely important distinction, drawn from theological teaching; it must serve as the starting point for all current discussion. The word "offer" can refer either to the unbloody immolation or to the oblation.[17] The unbloody *immolation* means that "at the words of consecration . . . Christ is made present upon the altar in the state of a victim."[18] The *oblation* is the offering of the divine Victim to God the Father "for the glory of the Blessed Trinity and for the good of the whole Church."[19] These refer to the immolation and oblation as accomplished in a ritual fashion.

[15] *Mediator Dei,* pargh 106.

[16] We are grateful to the Rt. Rev. Msgr. John A. Schulien, S.T.D., of St. Francis Seminary, Milwaukee, for some enlightening observations regarding the following points.

[17] Cf. our discussion of this matter in *The Mass and Liturgical Reform,* p. 188. [18] *Mediator Dei,* pargh. 92. [19] *Mediator Dei,* pargh. 92.

The faithful do not participate in any way whatsoever in the "offering" of the Sacrifice of the Mass insofar as it is an *unbloody immolation;* this "is performed by the priest and by him alone, as the representative of Christ and not as the representative of the faithful."[20] It is in the oblation, however, that the faithful do "offer" the Mass; they take part in the two ways mentioned: both *by* the priest and in union *with* him. We might present this in a diagram such as this:


Immolation: No part
Faithful offer the Sacrifice
Ritual or external: *Through* the priest
Oblation
Internal or spiritual: *With* the priest

(1) The faithful are said to offer the Mass "by the hands of the priest," or "through the priest" because of the essential relationship of the ordained priest to Christ, and the relationship, in turn, of Christ to the Mystical Body. The Mass is above all an act of the Whole Christ: the divine Head, and the Church—His Mystical Body. Thus the faithful actually offer this Mass by the hands of the priest; what he does, they are doing.

This is not an easy concept for modern man to grasp. We tend to overlook the reality of a social body such as the Church, and would feel that unless every single member actually places the act in question, the "entire community" is not acting. For some, social worship would be the sum total of many individual actions; but this is not what is meant.

St. Paul emphasized this in his discussion concerning the human body.[21] When the eye sees, he wrote, the entire body—the entire person—sees; when the ear hears, it is the entire person that hears. This is more than pure metaphor; it gives expression to the profound and unique nature of the Church, the intimate union between Christ and His members, and between the members themselves in

[20] *Mediator Dei,* pargh. 92.
[21] *I Cor.* 12.

Christ. It is a union based upon the unique juridical and theological bonds by which the Mystical Body is fashioned and joined together.

Not every act of the divine Head, however, is performed in the name of all the members. We might say with De Broglie that three things must be present in order to make this true:[22]

(a) It must be a *supernatural* act, emanating from Christ. The Church is a supernatural society; hence nothing else would be considered at present.

(b) It must be an action for which one of the members of the society has been designated as an *instrument* who places the act. It is this that links up the Church with Christ. If the divine Head places an act without such an instrument, it pertains to Him alone, and not at all to the Church.[23]

(c) It must be an act that corresponds to the *nature* and the *purpose* of the Church. If God accomplishes something that is "outside" the realm of the Church, God accomplishes this, certainly, but not through the Church.[24]

An act, then, which complies with these requirements could become an act of the entire community—the Whole Christ, acting together: the divine Head, the ordained minister, the faithful. In this fashion, the entire community offers the Mass through the hands of the priest, who acts as the instrument of Christ, and thus as the instrument of the Whole Christ.

(2) The faithful are also said to "offer" the Sacrifice of the Mass, insofar as it is an oblation, "in union with the priest." This sharing in the oblation does not imply, as we noted, that the faithful perform in any sense the *external* liturgical act; this is done by the ordained priest alone. Whatever role the laity exercise by their *active participation* in the liturgy, it is always non-essential. It may complete the liturgical signification, in the sense of giving

[22] De Broglie, *Nouvelle revue théologique, loc. cit.*, pp. 455-456.

[23] De Broglie cites the Assumption of Mary as an act which Christ performed alone, and in which He did not make use of the Church as an instrument; this was a divine act, in which the humanity of Christ was also active, but without the Church.

[24] By way of comparison, De Broglie suggests that you might say that Christ freed France by that *member* of the Church called Joanne of Arc; but you could not say that in Joanne, "the Church" saved France. The Church was not instituted for that purpose, so that this would have been accomplished outside the realm of the Church.

a more full expression to it, but such active participation can only be associated with the essential liturgical act; it cannot constitute it. Hence the faithful actually offer the Mass "in union with the priest," whether they make use of the various methods of participation or not. Obviously, it is highly desirable that they do so, since these methods have as their chief aim "to foster and promote the people's piety and intimate union with Christ and His visible minister, and to arouse those internal sentiments and dispositions which should make our hearts become like to that of the High Priest of the New Testament." [25]

What is implied above all is that "the people unite their hearts in praise, impetration, expiation and thanksgiving with the prayers or intention of the priest, even of the High Priest Himself." [26] In this way, "the one and same offering of the Victim . . . according to a visible sacerdotal right" makes it possible for the faithful to be offered together with Christ—precisely as His members: as "other Christ." [27]

Because of this, the faithful are not only joined to Christ and His ordained minister in offering up the Sacrifice of the Cross as it is renewed in the Mass, but as the members of Christ, they are also able to offer themselves as *victims.* This is not, however, a "new" offering, a new sacrifice, nor really "new victims." It is simply an extension, as it were, of the Sacrifice of Christ, including now the offering of His mystic members.

This self-dedication is not limited to the liturgical sacrifice; it is the very core of the Christian way of life. It is, however, at the liturgical sacrifice that this self-dedication receives its visible and ritual expression. It is then that "with the High Priest and through Him they offer themselves as a spiritual sacrifice. . . ." [28] Thus the "internal or spiritual" oblation of the faithful terminates both in the Sacrifice of the Cross itself, placed in their hands by Christ, and in the personal gift of self as other Christs.

This is simply a restatement of the traditional teaching that in the Mass we have Christ as the principal Priest, but that the Church—through its minister—is a secondary offerer; and that

[25] *Mediator Dei,* pargh. 106.
[26] *Mediator Dei,* pargh. 93.
[27] *Mediator Dei,* pargh. 93.
[28] *Mediator Dei,* pargh. 99.

we have Christ present as the principal Victim, but that the Church —in its dependence and oneness with Him, acting through His grace—is the secondary victim. This indicates neither a new sacrifice nor new victims actually. We must not forget that the "oneness' with Christ in the Mystical Body is not a pure metaphor, but expresses a reality that lies at the heart of the mystery both of the nature of the Church and the nature of the Sacrifice of the Mass. The notion of "oneness" with Christ as a sacrificial victim does not indicate a totally separate entity. It is simply an extension of the reality of the Mystical Body to the sacrificial level.

This can also be spoken of as the *affective* oblation, distinguished from the *effective* oblation which pertains only to the power of consecrating.[29] The priest alone accomplishes this act of sacrifice effectively, but the faithful are united with him affectively, both in regard to the Sacrifice of the Cross and to their own personal state as victims. This will admit of degrees, of course, depending upon the dispositions of the individuals; it is one of the chief aims of the Liturgical Movement to do what it can to intensify those dispositions. Yet even those members who are merely present will share in some degree, simply by virtue of their membership in the Church of Christ, His Mystical Body. Even the sinner can "offer" the Mass in a true sense, though a very imperfect one. So also can those members of the Church who are not actually present be said to "offer" the Mass; provided that they are joined by an habitual intention to the sacrificial activity of the Church, this can even be a very personal participation.[30]

In view of all of these considerations, we can understand how St. Peter might describe the members of the Church as a "royal priesthood, a holy nation," and how the Apocalypse might speak of Christ who "made us to be a kingdom, and priests to God his Father. . . ." [31] We are all living members of the *ecclesia sacrificans,* and we have our own role to play in the sacrificial life of that Church, whether it be that of priest or layman. This is the very basis of the modern liturgical movement and the reason for the various liturgical reforms. In attempting to explain the meaning

[29] Cf. De Broglie, *Gregorianum, loc. cit.,* pp. 536, 545-546.

[30] Cf. Tromp, *loc. cit.,* pp. 270-271; De Broglie. *Gregorianum, loc. cit.,* p. 532.

[31] *I Peter* 2:9; *Apoc.* 1:6 (also: *Apoc.* 5:10).

of the liturgy and promote a more active participation in the liturgical ceremonies, it aims simply at helping the faithful to understand more completely what they are actually *doing* at the Sacrifice of the Mass, and at encouraging them to give more vocal and more intelligent expression to this supernatural truth—a truth which only too often remains hidden in our theological tomes, and fails to enter into the daily life of our parochial activity, that day-to-day expression of the sacrificial and liturgical life of the Mystical Body of Christ upon earth.

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CARDINALS ON TRIAL: JOHN FISHER AND JOSEPH MINDSZENTY

Just about ten years ago Cardinal Mindszenty went on trial in Budapest for treason. It was the first time that a Cardinal has been brought to trial in secular courts since the trial of Cardinal Fisher. In studying the lives of both of these Cardinals we see a parallelism not only with regard to the circumstances and details of the trial, but likewise in their lives as teachers, bishops, and later on as Cardinals. Both were given the honor of the red hat shortly before they went to trial.

This parallelism begins in the lives of the Cardinals when they are marched to the courtrooms. As Cardinal Mindszenty plodded his weary way up the two flights of steps to the courtroom on the morning of Feb. 3, 1949, he met with six checkpoints of submachine gunners. We know that time does not change the cruelty of wicked men, because when Cardinal Fisher was marched to the courtroom William Rastell tells us he was accompanied "with a great number of halberds, bills, and glaives."[1]

As they entered the courtroom both men were sick, weak, and at the point of death. We see from a letter which Cardinal Fisher wrote to Cromwell that prison life and old age were the reasons for his condition:

> I might easily suffer that if they would keep my body warm. But my diet also God knows how slender it is at many times. And now in my age my stomach can take but few kinds of meat, which if I lack I decay forthwith, and fall into coughs, and diseases of my body, and cannot keep myself in health.[2]

The sickly condition of Cardinal John Fisher is quite evident from some of the comments made by William Rastell:

> . . . a long, lean, slender body nothing in manner but skin and bare bones, so that the most part that saw him there marveled to see any

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[1] Ernest Reynolds, *Saint John Fisher* (New York: Kenedy & Sons, 1955), p. 283.

[2] Paul McCann, *A Valiant Bishop Against a Ruthless King* (St. Louis: Herder, 1938), p. 224.

man bearing life, to be so far consumed, for he seemed a lean body carcase, the flesh clean wasted away and a very image of death, and as one might say, death in a man's shape, and using a man's voice. And therefore more monstrous was it that the king or any man could be so cruel to put such a man to death, yea, though he had been an offender, for very shortly he must have died by nature. . . . For it is the most cruel thing that can be, to put any to death that is presently dying.[3]

Because of his sickness the very time of the trial of Cardinal Fisher was delayed. No doubt the repeated interrogations while he was in prison were one of the contributing causes of the Cardinal's condition. In substance the interrogations centered around two important issues: namely, whether he would obey the king as Supreme Head of the Church of England, and whether he would acknowledge the king's marriage with Queen Anne to be lawful, and that with the Lady Catherine invalid.

We are told that Cardinal Fisher did not even walk all the way to his trial as we might be led to believe from some other accounts. Clothed in a black cloth gown he rode part of the way on horse back, and he was carried the rest of the journey by water. His extreme infirmity made this latter convenience even a hardship. This is confirmed by Cardinal Pole, who writes that "when he was carried out to his trial, in the short journey, from utter exhaustion he was at the point of death."[4] Thus we get a good idea of the appearance of Cardinal Fisher as he faced his accusers at the trial on June 17, 1535.

Likewise, we know that Cardinal Mindszenty was very ill when he appeared in court. He was so ill that after the trial was over, he told his mother that he could not remember having been taken to court. He asked her when the trial was to begin.

Little is known of what happened to Mindszenty in prison except for the fact that he was questioned for hours on end, at one time for eighty-two hours without rest. On the fifth day of the quizzing, Mindszenty became unconscious. The police doctor who was present brought him to with "stimulant pills" (probably aktedron) dissolved in water. The Cardinal's resistance broke, and he gave the answers which his torturers wished to hear. It is a fact that the

[3] Reynolds, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

[4] Thomas Bridgett, *Life of Blessed John Fisher* (London: Burns & Oates, 1888), p. 366.

hand of Mindszenty wrote the confession which the Hungarian government published on the first page of the *Yellow Book*. This testimony was used against him in court. The pills given by the police completely broke his will, leaving him with a violent headache, total dullness, and tormenting thirst.

We are sure that whether by drugs or otherwise, Mindszenty was reduced while in prison to the state of insanity, and that while in this state he wrote the "confessions" now in the Hungarian government's *Yellow Book*.

After the desired confession was extracted from Mindszenty, the Hungarian police allowed the broken man a few days respite prior to the trial. But a broken spirit is not mended that easily and we find the weary Mindszenty fighting throughout the trial to clear his brain:

> While the cross-examination of the Cardinal was in progress, the President of the Court, Dr. Olti asked according to the British United Press: "Are you mentally tired? Shall we adjourn? . . . Cardinal Mindszenty said he was willing to continue." Other reports mention this without quoting the Cardinal's words. But W. Pierre Denton, of the *Gazette de Lousanne*, relying on the broadcast of recordings made in court by Budapest Radio, says the Cardinal replied in a faint and halting voice: "Yes . . . Mr. President . . . I am," — long silence — "a man . . . broken in his mind" — long silence — "and in his body."[5]

As we can easily see, the very speech of the Cardinal and his handwriting, as is shown in the photostatic copies of his "confessions" in the *Yellow Book*, are those of a man under some strong influence. In a statement taking two and a half pages the Cardinal no less than twenty times divides his words in two. There are fifty-nine spelling mistakes in the text and they are, we are told by the Hungarians, not the kind of mistakes that might result from illiteracy; they are the marks of clouded faculties in the writer. None of the handwriting is normal, and to compare the signature with the normal signature is to be struck by the contrast.

Everything about the "confession" in the *Yellow Book* suggests that it was dictated. "I am an Hungarian nobleman," begins the Cardinal.

It was in this condition that the Cardinal appeared in court, sick in mind and body. Many who had known him for a considerable

[5] "The Cardinal's Trial," in *Tablet*, CXCIII (1949), 118.

time scarcely recognized him when his picture appeared in the papers:

> The photographs of the Cardinal himself in the dock which appeared in the London newspapers last Saturday showed, as was widely noticed, a man clearly under great strain, with brows tautly knit and eyes staring, in contrast to all earlier photographs.[6]

There was something sinister about the jury, the judges, and the officials for both of the Cardinals. The jury panel for Cardinal Fisher was selected by the sheriff who in turn was a nominee, and a creature of the king. We might well imagine that the sheriff would choose a jury that would give a favorable verdict. His very job depended upon it. "The jury (for Cardinal Fisher) was, to use the familiar phrase, a packed jury."[7]

The judge and state officials for Cardinal Mindszenty were also hand-picked; he was tried and convicted by former Nazis. They were turn-coat Nazis who joined the Communists in order to obtain power. The president of the People's Court, Dr. Vilmos Olti, had been a member of the Arrow-Cross Party, and he had served as a judge under the Nazis. The state official was Dr. Martin Bodonyi, an assessor of the military tribunal under the Nazi regime. With such a line-up Cardinal Mindszenty's case was hopeless before it began. The entire procedure was a farce. The New York *Herald-Tribune* said: "He [Mindszenty] is an obvious victim of the communist judicial process with which we are all so familiar . . . the absence of a jury, the packed bench, the 'tame' counsel, and the dubious confession."[8]

Strange as it may seem we also see a parallelism with regard to the actual trial proceedings of Cardinal Fisher and Cardinal Mindszenty. Both were accused of plotting against the government and were condemned for "treason."

When Cardinal Fisher came before the commissioners, he was not given the distinction of being addressed as a Cardinal, but was called "John Fisher, late of the city of Rochester, in the country of Kent, clerk: also called Lord John Fisher, late of Rochester, bishop."[9]

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 100.
[7] Bridgett, *op. cit.*, p. 364.
[8] "The Cardinal's Trial," in *Tablet*, CXCIII (1949), 99-100.
[9] McCann, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

The Cardinal was charged with refusing to call the king the Supreme Head of the Church of England. This was contrary to an Act of Parliament which made it high treason for any citizen within the realm to deny any of the titles of the king:

> Then was his indictment read, which was very long and full of words, but the effect of it was this: That he maliciously, traitorously, and falsely had said these words: The King our Sovereign Lord is not Supreme Head of the Church of England.[10]

Since the only witness for the Crown who testified in court was Solicitor-General Rich, we might conclude that the trial was conducted in a very irregular way. The only evidence which Rich offered to the court was a verbal statement.

When the Cardinal heard Rich give his evidence, he said to him: "Sir, I will not deny that I so said to you, but for all my so saying I committed no treason. For upon what occasion I so said, and for what cause, you yourself know right well."[11] And then the Cardinal declared before all that Rich came to him from the king, and that Rich had given a solemn oath that he would not tell anything that Fisher told him except to the king.

> "Now my lords," said the Cardinal: "I had as full and as sure a promise from the king by this his trusty and sure messenger as the king could make me by his word of mouth, that I should never be impeached nor hurt by mine answer that I should send unto him by this his messenger."[12]

Rich attempted to excuse himself when the Cardinal spoke such bold words against him, and answered: "If I had said to you in such sort as you have declared, I would gladly know what discharge is this to you in law against his Majesty for so directly speaking against the statute."[13]

When the Solicitor-General Rich spoke these words, the judges nodded their heads in approval. For no matter what Rich had promised, the Cardinal was not in any manner free to speak against the statutes of the law. For they said in effect that such speaking, even at the king's request, was high treason.

[10] Bridgett, *op. cit.*, p. 367.
[11] Reynolds, *op. cit.*, p. 277.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] McCann, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

Cardinal Fisher was taken by surprise at the decision which the judges gave. He further pleaded that the testimony of one man was not enough to prove him guilty. He said:

My Lords, if the law be so understood, then it is a hard exposition, and, as I take it, contrary to the meaning of them that made the law. But then, let me demand this question: Whether a single testimony of one man may be admitted as sufficient to prove me guilty of treason for speaking these words or no, and whether my answer negatively may not be accepted against his affirmative to my avail and benefit or no?[14]

But the judges ruled against Fisher once more, and said that since his case was a royal one, it depended for judgment by the jury as to whether the testimony was sufficient. In other words, the judges were "passing the buck." However, before the jury left the room in order to arrive at a decision, they were warned by the Chancellor that treason was a great offense. Thus, the Chancellor more or less implied that if the jury came back with any other decision than "guilty," then they too would be liable for punishment.

In a way the trial was pathetic. Here was a sick man, seventy-six years old, being tried for treason. He had no powerful friend in all England to defend him; yet Cardinal Fisher had God on his side, and he did not care who was against him. The jury did not tarry long in giving a decision. In a few minutes they were back with the verdict of "guilty." The Chancellor then pronounced in a solemn manner the horrible sentence.

You shall be led to the place from whence you came, and from thence shall be drawn through the city to the place of execution at Tyborne, where your body shall be hanged by the neck, and half alive you shall be cut down and thrown to the ground, your bowels to be taken out of your body and burned before you, being alive, your head to be smitten off, and your body to be divided into four quarters, and after your head and quarters to be set up where the King shall appoint and God have mercy on your soul.[15]

Cardinal Fisher gave a short speech, and was then led off to the Tower where he was to await his execution. Thus we see the end of a great humanist of the English Renaissance who, possessing the Catholic inheritance of the Middle Ages, had the Faith to know

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 247.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

what God wanted him to do. He died willingly, and like Thomas More loved his king, but loved God more.

The trial of Cardinal Mindszenty was in most respects quite similar to that of Cardinal Fisher. At the very opening of the trial the President of the Court read the indictment against the Cardinal which accused him of the following crimes: leading an organization aimed at the overthrow of the Republic; secondly, committing the crime of treason; thirdly, exchanging money on the black market.

The Communist chief judge was Vilmos Olti, who before the war had been one of Hungary's foremost Nazis. Olti fired an endless stream of questions at the Cardinal, methodically building up the case against him with "yes" and "no" answers. Olti allowed seven prosecution witnesses, and no defense witnesses.

Vilmos Olti charged the Cardinal with having hid a metal document-box in his cellar, containing petitions written by Mindszenty in his own handwriting, in which he urges the Western Powers to interfere in Hungary's internal affairs. Also contained in the document-box were replies that the envoys of those countries gave to Mindszenty.

According to the chief judge, Mindszenty also wrote a letter to the envoy of a Western Great Power in which he asked that the Crown of St. Stephen be not returned to Hungary. Mindszenty also was supposed to have received financial support from foreign states. He sold dollars received from abroad and dollar cheques on the black market, and thereby damaged the Hungarian State to the value of several hundred thousand dollars.

Osservatore Romano maintained that on their internal evidence most of the documents which the *Yellow Book* contained were not discovered in the Cardinal's residence at all, but were fabricated in the Central Police Station in Budapest.

If the Cardinal were innocent, it may be asked why under the prodding from Olti he would ever say: "I am very sorry about everything . . . the books, letters, money, and manipulations? I am guilty."[16] The only possible answer to this is that the Cardinal was still under the influence of the drugs which had been given to him.

[16] Bela Fabian, *Cardinal Mindszenty* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 89.

Just a few days before his arrest, the Cardinal sent a last communication to the Bench of Bishops, telling them that he had taken no part in conspiracy, that he had made no confession, and he would not resign. If they should hear that he had resigned or confessed, and even if this were authenticated by his own signature, they should consider this to be a result of human frailty. So we see how he declared his statement of guilt at the trial null and void in advance.

Others have different opinions as to the reasons for the Cardinal's admissions at the trial. A very interesting one appeared in the February 12, 1949, issue of the *Tablet:*

> We believe that anyone who has followed these curious proceedings closely will conclude that the Cardinal chose and followed a course that was harder for him than a dramatic defiance of his judges and appeal to the consciences of the world would have been; that he, so to say, played down his own trial, and seemed to invite that diminished stature which it was the great aim of his enemies to give him; and that he did this as pastor, in agreement with the other pastors of the Hungarian Catholics, as being the course most likely to help them in their present danger and sufferings. He knew very well that his enemies were anxious not only to remove him from leadership, because he had proved himself a leader, but to prove to his followers, that he was not the hero they had believed, but a confused and vacillating and nervous man. There was in him no yielding on any point of religion or moral principle. But there was a meekness, and an acceptance of the jurisdiction of men who have no right to sit as his judges.[17]

Furthermore, one might ask why Cardinal Mindszenty was arrested in the first place and put on trial? The late Pope Pius XII said that it was precisely for the purpose of disrupting the Catholic Church. In a sermon delivered at the time, Cardinal Griffin gave the following reason:

> It is obvious to the whole world why Cardinal Mindszenty has been put on trial. He has dared to oppose the totalitarian dictators who have seized power in Hungary. He has dared to proclaim human rights and religious liberty. He has dared to attack the government for confiscating religious schools and imposing Communistic teaching on the children.[18]

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[17] "After the Verdict," in *Tablet,* CXCIII (1949), 28.
[18] "Sermon of Cardinal Griffin," in *Tablet,* CXCIII (1949), 28.

Dr. Kalman Kiczko summed up the testimony. He was supposed to be the defense attorney, but he completely agreed that the defendant, Cardinal Mindszenty, had harmed the popular Democracy. Kiczko was happy that the defendant had admitted his guilt, because it was a gain for popular Democracy which was being unjustly accused in many parts of the world.

In Hungarian law the accused has the right of the last word at his trial. Taking advantage of this, Mindszenty made a long statement to the effect that he was never an enemy of the Hungarian people, and that he wanted peace for his Church.

The court adjourned for two days, and when it reconvened it sentenced the Cardinal to imprisonment for life. His sentence was later remitted to ten years.

In recapitulating the trial events of these two dynamic personalities, a reader cannot help being saddened that history is forced to record such infamy. Cardinal Fisher's trial had taken only one day and Cardinal Mindszenty's had lasted but three days. Both trials had been hasty, no valid evidence had been presented, and two innocent men had been condemned.

Though the trials of Cardinal Mindszenty and Fisher are separated by over four hundred years we see that time does not change the evil intentions of men. The trials of these two holy men were used merely as a means of religious persecution in order to give legal validity to the actions of tyrants even though it was evident to everyone that their actions were contrary to justice.

In a normal trial there are witnesses, evidence, and decisions, but neither of these trials were normal. The only reason why tyrants have such trials is to give their prepared condemnations the appearance of legality. It is no wonder that the Church stands in the way of these tyrants, because she insists on freedom of conscience, justice, and fundamental rights.

Since the time of Cardinal Fisher the trials sponsored by evil men have become more refined. Now they make use of scientific processes, drugs, for example, and shock therapy; but their intentions are the same.

We cannot help thinking that as these two innocent men walked from their courtrooms, they must have thought of their sentences and meditated on what Christ suffered for both of them years

before. He, too, was innocent; He, too, had a fake trial; He, too, was condemned, and a tyrant by the name of Pilate attempted to save face before the rest of the world. Such was the life of Christ; such also the life of His Church.

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MORS MARIAE, VITA AETERNA: AN INSIGHT INTO NEW TESTAMENT APOCRYPHA

When Christianity entered the world and made its impact on the lives and minds of men, its influence was profound and radical. There was about Christianity a force that was new and vital. This is why the term "newness" must be associated with Christianity in its many-sided aspects.[1] The term "new" runs through the pages of Sacred Scripture like a victorious rallying cry.

The Christian dispensation itself is called the New Testament, the New Covenant. There is a new relation brought about between man and God by the shedding of the blood of the new covenant unto the remission of sins.[2] Christ died on the cross, "and this is why He is mediator of a new covenant, that whereas a death has taken place for redemption from the transgressions committed under the former covenant, they who have been called may receive eternal inheritance according to the promise." [3] We who live under the new covenant "have confidence to enter the Holies in virtue of the blood of Christ, a new and living way which he inaugurated for us through the veil (that is, his flesh)." [4]

The teachings of Christ, the mediator of the covenant, also bear the feature of newness. His teaching is new cloth that cannot be used on an old garment; it is new wine that cannot be poured into old wine-skins.[5] From his own lips He says: "A new commandment I give you." [6] This quality of newness was recognized by others. When Christ healed a man of an unclean spirit, the bystanders were amazed and exclaimed: "What is this? What new doctrine is this?" [7] And when St. Paul proclaimed the message of Christ, that was sealed by his rising from the dead, some of the Epicureans and Stoic philosophers said: "May we know just what this new doctrine taught by thee is?" [8]

[1] K. Prümm, S.J., *Christentum als Neuheitserlebnis*, Freiburg, 1939.
[2] *Matt.*, 26: 28; *Mk.*, 14: 24; *Lu.*, 22: 20; *I Cor.*, 11: 25.
[3] *Hebr.*, 9: 15.
[4] *Hebr.*, 10: 19.
[5] *Matt.*, 9: 16-17; *Mk.* 2: 21-22; *Lu.* 5: 36-38.
[6] *John*, 3: 5.
[7] *Mk.*, 1: 27.
[8] *Acts*, 17: 19

Newness is predicated of the covenant inaugurated by Christ; newness is predicated of the teachings of Christ. Newness is also the characteristic of life in Christ. One who participates in the life of Christ is one who has undergone a new birth. In the words of Christ, such a person has been born again of water and the Holy Spirit.[9] Such a person is born not of blood, not of the will of the flesh, not of the will of man, but of God.[10] In the language of St. Peter, the baptized are new-born babes.[11]

By baptism, Christians have died to sin and have been born to a new life. With Christ they died and rose, for they have risen to new life, the life of grace.[12] Hence the words of St. Paul: "If then any man is in Christ he is a new creature: the former things have passed away; behold all things are made new."[13] From the moment of baptism the life of the Christian is different; it is new. From that time on, he walks in newness of life;[14] he serves in newness of spirit.[15] In this new life, "neither circumcision nor uncircumcision but a new creature is of any account."[16] Hence the deepening of this life is accomplished by concentrating on the new and by disregarding the old. After speaking to the Ephesians about their former manner of life and urging them to put off the old man, St. Paul goes on to say: "But be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, which has been created according to God in justice and holiness of truth."[17] In a similar manner he urges the Colossians: "Strip off the old man with his deeds and put on the new, one that is being renewed unto perfect knowledge according to the image of the Creator."[18]

Everything about Christianity, then, takes on this feature of newness, in keeping with the spirit of the words of Christ: "Behold I make all things new."[19] This characteristic of newness is seen

[9] *John*, 3: 5.
[10] *John*, 1: 13.
[11] *I Peter*, 1: 25.
[12] Cf. W. Bedard, O.F.M., *The Symbolism of the Baptismal Font in Early Christian Thought*, Washington, D. C., 1950.
[13] *II Cor.*, 5: 17.
[14] *Rom.*, 6: 4.
[15] *Rom.*, 7: 6.
[16] *Gal.*, 6: 15.
[17] *Eph.*, 4: 24.
[18] *Col.*, 3: 10.
[19] *Apoc.*, 21: 5.

in a very special way in the sphere of death. By reason of the doctrine, the dying, and the resurrection of Christ, death has taken on a new meaning. Because of Christ's work, Christians can well say: "Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy victory? O death, where is thy sting."[20] Because of Christ's work, St. Paul could well draw a contrast between the Christians and the "others who have no hope." [21]

Death, then, instead of being the end of life, is the beginning of everlasting life. This is the optimistic theme that fills the pages of the New Testament.[22] The teaching that death is the door to everlasting life is founded on the teaching of Christ Himself. This was brought out in connection with His teaching on the Eucharist, which, in Catholic theology, is not only a memorial of the Passion, a source of grace in the present, but also a pledge of future glory.[23] When revealing to the world the doctrine of the Eucharist, Christ said: "If anyone eat of this bread he shall live forever," and "He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has life everlasting and I will raise him up on the last day," and "He who eats this bread shall live forever." [24] The teaching that death is not the end of life, but rather the entrance to life everlasting, was brought out in an unusually difficult situation, i.e., in the very presence of death. Prior to the raising of Lazarus, Christ said to Martha: "I am the resurrection and the life; he who believes in me, even if he die, shall live; and whosoever lives and believes in me, shall never die." [25]

With the insistance on the theme of life in the New Testament writings, Christian antiquity continued to proclaim a victorious and optimistic teaching on death.[26] It was then that there was enunciated the doctrine that death was a birth to life and that the day of death was the birthday for heaven and heavenly life. In the Christian mystery, inaugurated at baptism, the Christian

[20] *I Cor.*, 15: 55.

[21] *I Thess.*, 4: 13.

[22] H.-M. Feret, O.P., "La mort dans la tradition biblique," in *Le mystère de la mort et sa célébration* (Lex Orandi XII, Paris, 1951), pp. 58-133.

[23] St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, III, q. 60, a. 3.

[24] *John*, 6: 52, 55, 59.

[25] *John*, 11: 25.

[26] J. Daniélou, S.J., "La doctrine de la mort chez les Pères de l'église," in *Le mystère de la mort*, pp. 134-56.

rose to the life of grace; now in death, he rises to an eventual sharing in the life of glory.[27]

In examining the theme of death as a birth to life in Christian antiquity, one notes a two-fold development.[28] At times death as a birth is spoken of under the image of attaining to light, of seeing the light. Incidentally, this practice has continued in English literature. The opening lines of a biography (even though the style is now somewhat old-fashioned) often read: "He first saw the light of day." From this one knew that the author was saying that the person was born. So it was in ancient Christian literature. Thus, speaking of his death as his coming to life, St. Ignatius of Antioch says: "Suffer me to receive the pure light. Once arrived there I shall be a man." [29] In classical and Christian antiquity light and life were synonyms.[30] The Christian sources, that speak of the soul as coming to light, are expressing the outlook that death is not death but life, that death is a birth.[31]

In describing death, besides using the circumlocution of attaining to light, early Christian authors also expressly refer to death as a birth and to the day of death as a birthday to everlasting life. For the period immediately after the New Testament there is the eloquent statement of St. Ignatius of Antioch, a passage which ranks with the most sublime passage in any literature. Ignatius was being brought to Rome to undergo martyrdom. His only desire was "to make his way to Jesus Christ." Fearing that Christians at Rome would use their influence to prevent his martyrdom, he wrote to them urging them not to do this. It was then that he wrote: "The pains of birth are upon me. Forgive me, brethren;

[27] In *Geburt, Hochzeit, Tod* (Berlin, 1911), E. Samter points out many parallels between birth, marriage, and death in various cultures. Certainly, in Christianity there are many parallels between baptism and death. Both are births; in both there is a dying and rising. Furthermore, white, the color of immortality, plays a part in both.

[28] See the writer's *Death and Burial in Christian Antiquity* (Washington, D. C., 1941), pp. 72-87.

[29] Ignatius of Antioch, *Ad Romanos*, VI, 2 (F. Funk-K. Bihlmeyer, *Die Apostolischen Väter* [Tübingen, 1924], p. 100).

[30] F. Dölger, *Gebet und Gesang im christlichen Altertum mit besonderer Richtung auf die Osten in Gebet und Liturgie* (Münster, 1925), pp. 384 ff.

[31] Tertullian, *De Anima*, 53-56; *Passio SS. Perpetuae et Felicitatis*, XI, 4; Ambrose, *De obitu Theodosii*, 32, 39; *De consolatione Valentiniani*, 64; John Chrysostom, *Hom. 45 in Actus Apostolorum*, 4.

do not obstruct my coming to life." [32] In a similar manner, the day of the martyrdom of St. Polycarp is his birthday. In the account of his martyrdom we read: "There the Lord will permit us to come together according to our power in gladness and joy and celebrate the birthday of his martyrdom." [33]

The theme of death as a birth to life is constantly to the fore in early Christian literature. In inscriptions and acclamations also one meets the statements that the deceased were born to eternal life; one comes face to face with the prayer: "May you live."[34] This ancient outlook is summed up perfectly in the dying prayer of St. Macrina, the sister of St. Gregory of Nyssa: "Thou hast delivered us from the fear of death. Thou hast made the end of our life here below the beginning of true life." [35]

The foregoing remarks have shown that the theme of death as a birth to life runs through patristic literature. What is true of patristic literature is also true of apocryphal literature. In apocryphal literature there is a group of documents that make up a literary genre known as the *Transitus Mariae*. This literature, that supplies information on the later life and death of Mary and that postulates her glorification on theological grounds, is regarded as the last in a long line of writings that make up the Apocryphal New Testament. It is usually designated in the category of supplementary Gospels. This literature is a glorification of Mary as the *Theotokos*. Hence it is usually regarded as being post-Ephesus in origin. It seems that it originated in Syria in the latter part of the fifth century. The golden age of this literature is the sixth century which gives us the Syriac account of Pseudo-James, the Latin of Pseudo-Melito, the Greek of Pseudo-John, the Coptic of Theodosius of Alexandria. Allied to this latter is the Coptic account of Pseudo-Evodius.[36]

[32] Ignatius of Antioch, *Ad Romanos*, VI, 1-2 (Funk-Bihlmeyer, *op. cit.*, p. 100).

[33] *Martyrium Polycarpi*, XVIII, 3 (*ibid.*, p. 130).

[34] F. Cabrol, "Acclamations," *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie*, I (Paris, 1907), cols. 240-65.

[35] Gregory of Nyssa, *Vita S. Macrinae* (PG XLVI, 984).

[36] M. Jugie, *La mort et l'assomption de la Sainte Vièrge* (Vatican City, 1944), pp. 103-61; C. Balic, O.F.M., *Testimonia de assumptione B.V. Mariae ex omnibus saeculis* (Rome, 1948), pp. 14-65; 137-53; J. Quasten, *Initiation aux Pères de l'église*, tr. J. Laporte (Paris, 1955), pp. 280 f.

With their exalted ideas on Mary as the Mother of God, writers of these accounts at times express the wish that Mary should not die, that she should remain immortal, that she should be exempted from death. Thus, in the account of Pseudo-Evodius, Peter and the disciples ask Christ: "Is it not possible that she should never die?" [37] Similarly, in the Sahidic fragment of the same work we read: "Our Lord and our God, canst thou cause her never to die?" [38] While expressing this ardent hope of immortality, these accounts take for granted that Mary died and then they go into reasons to show why this was so. In Pseudo-Evodius, after the request was made that Mary should never die, Christ is portrayed as saying:

> I wonder at you, O my holy apostles. . . . Can the word that I spoke from the first prove a lie? No, God forbid. But I pronounced a sentence from the first upon all flesh, that they must needs taste death. Because of the flesh that I took, I also tasted death, I who am the Lord of all men, that I might loose the pangs of death.[39]

In his sermon for the feast of the Assumption, Theodosius of Alexandria[40] adduces similar reasons. He pictures Christ addressing Mary:

> Oh my beautiful Mother, when Adam transgressed my commandment, I passed upon him a sentence, saying, Adam, thou art earth and thou shalt return to the earth again. For I also, the life of all men, tasted death in the flesh which I took from thee, in the flesh of Adam, thy forefather. Yet since my Godhead was one with it, therefore I raised it from the dead. I did not wish to suffer thee to taste death, but to translate thee up to the heavens as Enoch and Elias. But these also, even they must needs taste death at last. And if this happens to thee, wicked men would think concerning thee, that thou art a power which came down from heaven, and that this dispensation took place in appearance.[41]

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[37] Pseudo-Evodius, *The Falling Asleep of Mary*, VIII, 9 (F. Robinson, *Coptic Apocryphal Gospels* [Texts and Studies IV, 2, Cambridge, 1896], p. 55).

[38] *First Sahidic Fragment*, VIII, 9 (*ibid.*, p. 69).

[39] Pseudo-Evodius, *The Falling Asleep of Mary*, VIII, 10-12 (*ibid.*, p. 55).

[40] E. Amann. "Théodose d'Alexandrie," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, XV (Paris, 1946), cols. 325-28.

[41] Theodosius, *The Falling Asleep of Mary*, V, 15-21 (F. Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-09).

According to these documents, then, Mary's death is based on the general law of death in Adam and on the fact that Christ himself underwent death. The reality of Mary's death is also a refutation of Docetism, for it proves that Mary is real, that Christ who was born of her is real, and that the redemptive work of Christ took place in reality. The *Transitus* literature does not always delve into the reasons for Mary's death, but it does universally witness that she died.[42] In this it is a clear voice in the general teaching of the historical past that Mary died.[43]

When these writers speak of Mary's death, they cannot help but proclaim the fulness of the Christian mystery of death.[44] If death is a birth to life, then how much more so is this true of Mary, who is the Mother of God, who is ever-virgin, who is the associate of Christ, who is all holy? Thus, when these writers speak of Mary's death, they speak of it in terms of life. It is not death but life and life everlasting. This is not to say that this is the only way in which these sources describe the death of Mary. They also speak of Mary as going to the joys of paradise, as going to the new Jerusalem, as being in the treasuries of the Father, as being in unspeakable joy in the glory of the Trinity. Here attention is focused only on those expressions that speak of Mary's death in terms of life.

Describing the death of Mary, the Latin account of Pseudo-Melito states:

> And behold suddenly the Lord Jesus Christ arrived with a vast multitude of angels, and a great light came down upon that place, and the angels were singing a hymn and praising the Lord. Then the Savior spoke and said: Come, thou most precious pearl, enter into the treasury of eternal life.[45]

In the Greek account of Pseudo-John, the archangel Gabriel came to Mary to announce her death in these words:

[42] W. Burghardt, S.J., "Testimony of the Patristic Age concerning Mary's Death," *Marian Studies*, VII (1957), pp. 70-76.

[43] The same seventh volume of Marian Studies contains various papers dealing with the death of Mary in the verdict of history.

[44] J. Hild, O.S.B., "La mort, mystère chrétienne," in *Le mystère de la mort et sa célébration*, pp. 210-49.

[45] Pseudo-Melito, *Transitus Mariae*, VI (C. Tischendorf, *Apocalypses apocryphae* [Leipzig, 1866], p. 128).

Hail, thou who bore Christ our God. Thy prayer has passed through the heavens unto Him who was born of thee, and has been accepted. Henceforth, in keeping with thy petition, thou shalt leave the world and rise above the heavenly places, unto thy Son, unto true and immortal life.[46]

In the Syriac account of Pseudo-James, Gabriel's message of death is likewise a promise of life, as seen in these words: "Hail to thee, Mother of God. Thy prayer has been accepted in heaven before thy Son, our Lord Jesus Christ. And therefore thou shalt depart from the world unto life everlasting."[47]

The theme that death is not death but life is very pronounced in the Coptic writings. In the sermon of Theodosius of Alexandria, when Christ came to call Mary in death He is portrayed as saying: "Now, O My beloved Mother, arise, let us go hence, from the house of weeping into the city of gladness, from the land of the dead into the land of the living." [48] Similarly, when Christ came to raise up the body of Mary and glorify her both in soul and body, He is pictured as saying over the body: "Arise, O thou body, that dies according to nature: wear thy deathless soul, that thou may be altogether deathless, and that I may take thee to the land of the living." [49]

Even more graphic is the affirmation of life in the writing of Pseudo-Evodius. When Mary died the women wept. One of them, Salome, reminded Christ that if He had not left the room Mary would not have died. Then it was that Christ replied: "Mary My virgin Mother did not die, but lived. For the death of My Mother is not death, but it is life forever." [50] The same answer is found in the Sahidic fragment of Pseudo-Evodius where Christ replied: "She did not die, but lived. For the death of My Mother is not death, but it is life." [51]

Equally vivid in its affirmation of death as life is the testimony found in the *History of Joseph the Carpenter,* a work that has a

[46] Pseudo-Johannes, *Liber de dormitione Mariae,* 3 (*ibid.,* p. 96).

[47] Pseudo-Jacobus, *Transitus Mariae,* I (A. Lewis, *Apocrypha syriaca* [Studia sinaitica, XI, London, 1902], p. 20).

[48] Theodosius, *The Falling Asleep of Mary,* IV, 14 (F. Robinson, *op. cit.,* p. 105).

[49] Theodosius, *The Falling Asleep of Mary,* VIII, 11 (*ibid.,* p. 127).

[50] Pseudo-Evodius, *The Falling Asleep of Mary,* XII, 13 (*ibid.,* p. 60).

[51] *Second Sahidic Fragment,* XII, 13 (*ibid.,* p. 77).

close affinity to the earlier apocrypha of the Protoevangelium of James and the Infancy Gospels.[52] In the Bohairic account, on the occasion of the death of Joseph, Christ is represented as saying to Mary:

> O My beloved Mother, who is there among men, who has worn the flesh, that will not taste death? For death is the ruler of mankind, O My beloved Mother. For thou also must needs die as all men. Whether it be My father Joseph or thou, My blessed Mother, your death is not death, but it is life eternal and unceasing.[53]

The same sentiment is voiced in the Sahidic fragment. Here Christ states: "But whether it be My beloved father Joseph or thou, O My beloved Mother, your death is not death, but it is life for ever." [54]

To speak of death, under the image of life, was very popular in Christian antiquity. It seems safe to assert that it is not so pronounced and to the foreground in modern Christian times as it was in the past. Such an expression is grounded in Catholic belief; it forms part of Christian culture. As a cultural pattern, it can be more to the fore in one age than in another. Nevertheless, cultural patterns like this never die out completely because of the permanence of the belief underlying them. They are the property of the Church who can and does dig into its treasuries for an apt expression of its thought and teaching. In modern times, for the outlook that death is life, one can turn to the Preface of the Requiem Mass, which Pope Benedict XV inserted into the Roman Missal in 1919.[55] There it states:

> In Him (Christ) there has dawned upon us the hope of a blessed resurrection, that the promise of future immortality may console those whom the certainty of dying saddens. Unto Thy faithful O Lord, life is changed; life is not taken away. And when this earthly dwelling place is dissolved, there is prepared an everlasting abode in heaven.

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[52] J. Quasten, *op. cit.*, p. 143; S. Morenz, *Die Geschichte von Joseph dem Zimmermann* (Berlin, 1951), p. 115.

[53] *Bohairic Account of the Death of Joseph*, XVIII, 4-8 (F. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 138).

[54] *Third Sahidic Fragment*, XVIII, 7 (*ibid.*, p. 155). L. Lefort, "A propos de l'histoire de Joseph le charpentier," *Muséon*, LXVI (1953), p. 217.

[55] Benedict XV, *Urbis et Orbis*, April 9, 1919, AAS, XI (1919), 190.

One can likewise look to the words of our present Holy Father, Pope John XXIII. In an address to the clergy of Venice on the occasion of his sending the body of Pope St. Pius X there for a few days, we read: "Forty-five years from the day he was reborn into his heavenly homeland, Pius X has returned for a few days to Venice." [56]

Vita mutatur, non tollitur; life is changed, life is not taken away! This is the codification of the Christian outlook on death. The foregoing pages show that this is a theme that runs through apocryphal writings. Being products of a particular milieu, they cannot help but reflect current outlooks and mirror contemporary viewpoints. This is why they will always be of importance for the historian of ideas in general, and for the historian of theology and Mariology in particular. These works reecho the Christian teaching that death is life. To the authors of these works, the death of Mary is not death, it is life and life everlasting.

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[56] John XXIII; *A quarantacinque, Osservatore Romano,* April 23, 1959; *The Pope Speaks,* V (1959), p. 293.

FIFTY YEARS AGO

The leading article in *The American Ecclesiastical Review* for April 1910, by Fr. J. F. Sheahan, entitled "The Three Days," is an illustrated narration of the three momentous days embracing the passion, death and resurrection of Our Divine Lord. The author considers these days as beginning at sunset, so that the Last Supper took place actually on the Parasceve, or Friday. He emphasizes the fact that the guards at the tomb did not see Our Lord risen from the dead. Their terror was caused by the sight of an angel. . . . "The Biblical Commission and the Degrees it Confers" is the title of an article by Fr. Hugh Pope, O.P. He tells us that the Biblical Commission was established by Pope Leo XIII in 1902, and empowered by Pope Piux X in 1904 to grant the degrees of Licentiate and Doctor in Sacred Scripture. He also describes the requirements for the gaining of the degrees

and the written examinations. He informs us that up to the time of the writing of this paper thirty-eight students had passed the examination for the Licentiate and four for the Doctorate, but that many others had failed. . . . Fr. W. Leen contributes an interesting article on "The Origin and Present Condition of the Russian Orthodox Church." He points out that this Church is fully dependent on the authority of the Czar. It contains, however, millions of devout persons. It is characterized by a strong devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary. There are even noticeable tendencies toward the reunion of this schismatic body with the Catholic Church. . . . Fr. R. F. O'Connor, of Ireland, contributes the first installment of the biography of a famous French Capuchin, Père Marie Antoine, who died in 1907. . . . Fr. M. Martin, S.J., writing on the Roman Curia, describes the Apostolic Chancery, the Apostolic Datary and the Apostolic Camera. . . . Fr. C. Clifford, under the heading "The Monk as a Witness in Apologetics," proposes the vigorous religious life of the Catholic Church down through the centuries as one of the marks of the sanctity of the Church. . . . Fr. J. Selinger argues for the obligation of the parish clergy to take part in social reform work. . . . Professor De Becker, of Louvain, writes against the view, advocated previously by Fr. Stephen Donovan, O.F.M., according to which the State may at times sterilize persons to protect society from the procreation of mental defectives. . . . The Analecta contain a letter from the Holy See approving the "League of the Good Shepherd," established in St. Patrick's Church, Washington, D. C., for the purpose of praying for the conversion of heretics.

F. J. C.

Answers to Questions

STABAT MATER

Question: On the feast of the Seven Sorrows (September 15th) may priests in a large parish, where daily High Masses are celebrated at half-hour intervals, omit the Sequence *"Stabat Mater"* on the supposition that there is a comparison *a pari* between the set of circumstances envisaged in the Decree for the Simplification of the Rubrics, Title VII, n. 6 (regarding the *Dies Irae*) and the difficulty confronting these priests who must keep their crowded schedule on time?

Answer: In the "New Edition Revised Throughout" of J. B. O'Connell's *The Celebration of the Mass* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956) we read: "The recitation of the Sequence is (a) *Obligatory:* (i) On the feast day in all Masses . . . (b) *Excluded* in votive Masses" (p. 174). Since this new edition carefully applies the Decree of March 23, 1955, it would seem that Father O'Connell feels that we cannot argue from the changes made with regard to the *Dies Irae* to possible changes in the use of the other Sequences.

VOTIVE MASSES

Question 1: Is it permitted to use a votive Mass of the Blessed Virgin on one of her feasts, *e.g.,* the *Salve, sancta parens* V on the feast of the Presentation, or the *Rorate, coeli, desuper* I on the feast of the Immaculate Conception?

Answer 1: "It is not permitted to say a votive Mass of the Blessed Virgin on a day when one of her feasts is being celebrated; in such a case the Mass of the feast is to be said, and *more festivo* (not *more votivo*), *i.e.,* with *Gloria* and Creed" (J. B. O'Connell, *The Celebration of the Mass,* p. 70). This prohibition is deduced from S.R.C. 2542, and 2683, 1.

Question 2: Must a *solemn* votive Mass always be a sung Mass, or may it be a low Mass (with *Credo* and *Ite*), given the usual

conditions of a large gathering, serious and public reason, and the approval of the Ordinary?

Answer 2: A *solemn* votive Mass must be at least a *Missa cantata* or what we call a High Mass. Only then may the *Credo* and *Ite* be used. There are indeed certain votive Masses, such as the Mass of the Sacred Heart on First Fridays and the Mass of Christ, High and Eternal Priest on First Thursdays which, under specified conditions, may be celebrated after the manner of solemn votive Masses even when they are not sung Masses, but these are called "Privileged Votive Masses."

THE GESTURE AT THE ORATE FRATRES

Question: The *Ritus* (VII, 7) states, with regard to the rubrics for the *Orate Fratres: ". . . tum, junctis manibus ante pectus, demissisque oculis ad terram, a sinistra manu ad dexteram vertit se ad populum, et versus eum extendens et jungens manus, dicit . . . Orate Fratres. . . ."* Should *"versus eum, etc."* be translated as "and extending and joining his hands towards the people," so that the celebrant, unlike at the *Dominus vobiscum,* not only extends and joins his hands before his breast but also performs this action in the direction of the people?

Answer: Martinucci, in his carefully detailed explanation of the rubrics of the Mass, tells us that the gesture at the *Orate Fratres* is made in the same way as at the *Dominus vobiscum: ". . . expandens simul et colligens manus, ut ad Dominus vobiscum"* (Vol. I, P. I, p. 354). J. B. O'Connell likewise sees no additional movement toward the people required by the *"versus eum"* of the *Ritus* (*The Celebration of the Mass,* p. 321).

WHAT ORDO?

Question: Which calendar (Ordo) should a religious follow when he goes to a non-sectarian camp or the like to say Mass on a portable altar set up in one of the buildings at the camp?

Answer: Although I find in approved authors no answer to this specific question, the solution would seem to lie in considering such a Mass as analogous to that celebrated in a private oratory.

We should then follow the *Regulae in Missae Celebratione Servandae* set down in the *Ordo iuxta Kalendarium Universalis Ecclesiae pro 1960* (Rome), p. xxv: "In private oratories . . . it is correct to use the Calendar of the celebrant, but the Calendar of the place may be used."

MASS WITHOUT A SERVER

Question: While the Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments of October 1, 1949, concerning the obligation of having a server, has weakened the extrinsic probability of Cappello's opinion that a priest may say Mass without a server even *ratione devotionis,* has this Instruction completely destroyed the probability of the opinion?

Answer: In *Priests' Problems* (London: Burns and Oates, 1958), a collection of monthly replies made by Canon E. J. Mahoney, D.D., in *The Clergy Review,* edited by the Rev. L. L. McReavy, J.C.D., we read on p. 83: "The lenient view that one may celebrate Mass without a server 'devotionis causa' was held to be probable not only by Cappello but also by Prümmer and Wouters, and it was well defended more recently in America by writers in the *Ecclesiastical Review.* . . . Since the 1949 instruction, it seems certain to us that the lenient view can no longer be defended. It is within the competence of the Sacred Congregation to correct abuses, which has now been done in no uncertain terms. . . . Commenting on the above instruction, Cappello writes: 'Instructio memorat quatuor causas in quibus ex communi doctrina consensu fas est sacrum facere sine ministro. Enumeratio dici nequit exclusiva; nam, praeter casus recensitos, alii quoque in praxi verificari possunt.' He does not, indeed, mention 'devotion' as one of these causes, but it appears that unless this henceforth is to be excluded the words of the instruction have scarcely any meaning, for 'devotion' is undoubtedly the weakest of all the reasons alleged by writers as an excuse justifying non-observance of the law."

JOHN P. MCCORMICK, S.S.

A CATHOLIC FOR PRESIDENT

Question: What should a priest say to his parishioners when they question him on the current problem whether or not a Catholic may or should be President of the United States?

Answer: In the first place, a priest should remember that he is forbidden by the statutes of the Church to take part in political affairs as such. The Third Council of Baltimore warned priests not to mingle in politics. (Of course, this does not mean that the priest is forbidden to vote. He may and should.) The Council added: "The admonitions, however, are not to be understood in the sense that they must be silent about the grave obligation by which the citizens are bound even in public matters, always and everywhere, to labor for the greater good of religion and of the country, according to the dictates of conscience before God" (*Acta et decreta Concilii Plenarii Baltimorensis Tertii* [Baltimore 1886], n. 83). Hence, when Catholics ask enlightenment and guidance on the question as to whether or not it would be advisable to have a Catholic President in our country, the priest should be prepared to give them some general principles, without in any way campaigning for any candidate.

In the first place, the priest should inform the questioner that there is nothing in the Catholic religion that should prevent a Catholic from being a good President. On the contrary, the teachings of the Catholic Church regarding the duties of those in public office, if conscientiously followed, would help a person in public life to fulfil his obligations more effectively. Certainly, the Church's insistence on perfect honesty in political officials, on the duty of the public official to seek the good of state or country primarily rather than his own advantages, and above all, on the doctrine that every person with civil authority represents God Himself, should help a man in the responsible office of President of our country to fulfil his duties correctly, if he conscientiously observes these principles.

Secondly, the priest should tell those who seek information on this question that Catholics are bound in conscience to vote for the candidate whom they consider best suited for the office, whatever may be his religious affiliation. If a Catholic cast his ballot for a candidate because he was a Catholic and passed over a non-

Catholic candidate who, in his estimation, would make a better President, he would be guilty of sin. In other words, there should be no "Catholic Party" in our land. Of course, this puts a Catholic candidate at a disadvantage. For, while many of our citizens believe that it is lawful to vote against a Catholic merely because of his faith, a conscientious Catholic must regard it as wrong to vote for a Catholic merely because of his faith. But the principle that is at stake must be the Catholic voter's primary consideration, no matter how irked he may be at the spirit of narrow-mindedness and bigotry that is so widespread in our land today. The common good of our nation, not the particular religion of the candidates, must be the determining factor for the Catholic in casting his ballot.

Thirdly, any Catholic in office must regulate his conduct by the law of God as this is proclaimed by the Catholic Church. The same principle should be observed by the Protestant and Jewish officeholder—each must regard as the primary norm of conduct the divine laws as his particular religion proposes it. The public official who would have no regard for God's law in the management of civil affairs is a person who cannot be trusted, for he would make merely human norms the ultimate determining factor in every public issue. He would subscribe to the policy: "My country, right or wrong," the policy followed in totalitarian states. That is why a Protestant or Jew who would acknowledge a divine law and presumably live up to it in his official conduct should be preferred to a Catholic candidate who would reject the obligation to follow any norm higher than the material welfare of his country or the will of the majority of the voters. In practice, the Catholic, the Protestant and the Jew (presuming all to be good and conscientious men) would be in agreement in the interpretation of God's law, for it would be, in the case of our government, the natural moral law, perceptible to every intelligent and honest person, at least in its general principles. I do not hesitate to say that there has not been a single instance in the political history of the United States since the birth of our nation when the President was called on to make a decision or to act, in which a conscientious Catholic President could not have decided or have acted in a way that would not restrict any of the legal rights of the non-Catholic citizens.

Fourthly, Catholics should be told that it would not benefit the Catholic Church or Catholics as such to have a Catholic President. If he is the man best suited to fulfill the obligations of the office of Chief Executive, benefit would come to our country, and above all, the stigma of bigotry attached to our nation by those who would reject any Catholic, however competent he may be, would be removed. If he were an upright Catholic, fully aware of the teachings of his Church, he would know that it would be sinful for him to show any special favor to the Catholic Church or to Catholics, because he would be bound in conscience to accept the principle of civil equality for all religions in the United States. If anything, it might be detrimental to the Church or to Catholics to have a Catholic President, because almost any national misfortune or calamity that would occur would be ascribed to his religion by many non-Catholics, however free from responsibility he might be. And, if a Catholic inclined to be compromising were elected, he might even be hesitant to give his co-religionists their full civil rights. He might "bend over backward" in the attempt to prove that he does not wish to give any special favor to Catholics.

Finally, Catholic citizens of the United States should realize that, if the spirit of anti-Catholic bigotry pervades the land in the near future, they must retain the spirit of charity toward those who are hostile to the Church, ascribing their antagonism to ignorance rather than to malice. And Catholics should be urged to pray that such persons may be enlightened so that they will come to understand correctly the Catholic Church and Catholic doctrine.

HAS ERROR ANY RIGHTS?

Question: Recently in a widely read popular magazine, a prominent Episcopalian clergyman took issue with the principle that "error has no rights." Will you please give an interpretation of this principle, especially as applied to religion?

Answer: When we say "error has no rights," we are using a figure of speech. Rights belong to intellectual beings only, not to abstract concepts. What we mean is that a person has no real right, as far as God's law is concerned, to hold as true what is objectively false, or to propagate it or to base his actions on it. It is difficult to see how any intelligent person can object to this

principle. The intellect has truth for its proper object, so that when it accepts something false as true it is not functioning properly, just as the will, made for the quest for good, is not acting as it should when it seeks moral evil. In other words, a person has no more right to believe what is false than he has to will what is evil. A person's error may be perfectly inculpable—in other words, he may be in invincible ignorance—but nevertheless, it is unfortunate, and he has no real right to accept in good faith what is erroneous, just as he had no real right to perform an evil action, albeit he erroneously thinks he is doing good.

We use this principle frequently in the affairs of human life. The schoolboy who answers in his examination that New York is the capital of New York State will find from the reduction of his grade that he has no right to hold this. The typist who misspells many words may protest that she has a right to spell in this manner because she is convinced it is correct, but that will not prevent her from being discharged. It may seem an innocuous error to hold that the moon is made of green cheese, but if the professor of astronomy upholds this idea in class, he is liable to lose his post. The nurse who regularly gives patients the wrong medicine—even though in good faith—will not hold her job very long. The basis of all these procedures in daily life is the principle just enunciated—that a person has no right to hold error or to act on it in practice, even though he is sincere in believing his erroneous notion.

If there is any department of life to which this principle is applicable, it is in the sphere of religion. A person has no right to hold religious beliefs that are contrary to reason or to revelation, particularly in view of the fact that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, has commanded that all men accept the religious doctrines preached by Him on earth and committed to the teaching authority of the Church which He established, the Catholic Church. Certainly, no one has a right to do anything contrary to the command of God Himself. Pope Pius XII declared this principle very definitely when he asserted in the address to jurists known as *Ci riesce,* in 1953: "That which does not correspond to truth or to the norm of morality objectively has no right to exist, to be spread or to be activated" (Cf. *The American Ecclesiastical Review,* CXXX, 2 [February, 1954], 134 f.).

But is it not true that God judges men according to their sincerely formed consciences, and that a person who judges some form of non-Catholic religion to be true and even obligatory, may, and even must, accept it? This is perfectly true, and such a sincere person may be much more pleasing to God than many Catholics. Indeed, if for some temporal reason, against his sincerely formed conscience, such a person entered the Catholic Church he would commit a grave (formal) sin. But we cannot say that such a person has a *real* right to accept and to practice the religion he professes. For a *real* right is something objective, based on what is objectively true. We can say that he has a *purely subjective right,* or a *right according to his honest conscience*—but we cannot ascribe to him a right without some qualification. In the words of Merkelbach: "As regards an invincibly erroneous conscience, although in the internal forum a man may and must follow it, he has not truly and properly a right to do so; for such a right is founded on the objective relations of things. He has only a deemed right (*jus existimatum*)" (*Summa theologiae moralis,* I, n. 211).

Such a purely subjective right or *jus existimatum,* though the person's sincerity is pleasing to God, does not give him an unrestricted claim to put his ideas into practice, particularly when others will thereby be injured. We have cases, here in the United States, in which a person who sincerely believes some religious doctrine can be legally prevented from putting it into practice. For example, the civil law forbids polygamy, even to those who, like the Mormons, sincerely believe this practice to be in accord with God's law. The member of the Jehovah's Witnesses who refuses a blood transfusion for his sick child on religious grounds can have his objection superseded by a court order requiring that the child be given this treatment. It is on this score that a Catholic government—that is, the government of a nation that has been thoroughly Catholic in population and customs for centuries—may sometimes forbid non-Catholic propaganda on the grounds that this is harmful to the spiritual welfare of the Catholic citizens.

We say that *sometimes* the government of a Catholic nation possesses this right to forbid non-Catholic propaganda; because it may sometimes be the better policy to refrain from such action and to permit non-Catholic propaganda without any restriction. Sometimes the reason given for this tolerance is the fact that it

is *more expedient;* and this is quite correct when we take the word *expedient* in its primary sense as "suited to the circumstances or the occasion." Unfortunately, the word *expedient* has a secondary meaning "based on advantage rather than on what is right and just" so that when *expediency* is proposed as the reason for the tolerance of non-Catholic propaganda by a Catholic government it may give the impression that the only reason for tolerating such propaganda is that the Church and Catholics happen to find it more convenient. This is a mistaken notion. What is really meant is that the policy of tolerance will produce more good or prevent greater evil than the policy of restriction—and in evaluating these effects reasonable consideration for non-Catholics who sincerely believe that they may, or even must, attempt to win adherents to their particular form of religion should be given a place. In *Ci riesce* Pope Pius XII referred to this as "regard for those who in good conscience (though erroneous, but invincibly so) are of different opinion" (*loc. cit.,* 137). Sixteen years ago I proposed such a justifying reason for tolerance on the score that "a policy of restriction might lead some non-Catholics to enter the Catholic Church, not through conviction but merely to obtain greater liberty or to gain political favor." And I added: "This would cause a grave spiritual evil which the civil rulers would justly wish to avert" (*Freedom of Worship* [Paulist Press, N. Y., 1944], 11-12). In a recent article on toleration by Cardinal Lecaro of Bologna (Cf. *Catholic Mind,* Jan.-Feb., 1960, 12-24), His Eminence applies this argument to the fact that unworthy communions would follow if restrictive measures by a Catholic government induced insincere conversions.

In the words of Pope Pius XII: "The duty of repressing moral and religious error cannot be an ultimate norm of action. It must be subordinate to *higher and more general norms,* which in *some circumstances permit,* and even perhaps seem to indicate as the better policy, toleration of error in order to promote *a greater good*" (*Ci riesce, loc. cit.,* 134). The Holy Father stated that this can occur *in certain circumstances,* implying that a Catholic government *sometimes* has a right to repress anti-Catholic propaganda; but I believe that it can be held that nowadays the better policy would be complete religious tolerance throughout the entire world. Indeed, in 1944 I wrote: "A Catholic would not be inconsistent

with any principle of his faith if he held that in the circumstances that prevail at the present time it would be a most feasible plan to have complete religious toleration throughout the whole world" (*Freedom of Worship,* p. 13). It is to be noted, however, that this does not mean that, *as far as God's law is concerned* a person would have the right *to spread an erroneous doctrine.* The unchangeability of the doctrine that a person cannot have a *real* right to hold or spread a false doctrine is expressed by Cardinal Lecaro when, after upholding civil tolerance, he says: "The reason for *dogmatic* intolerance is such that the Church cannot renounce it in any way." But, in the circumstances described, a person would have a right *not to be impeded from spreading false doctrine.*

In the United States a legal right is granted to all religions to be free from all restrictions in the practice and propagation of their beliefs (as long as they do not interfere with public order). From the time when this measure was enacted by the Bill of Rights in 1791, the Catholics of our country have accepted it wholeheartedly. Catholics have never attempted to restrict the religious activity of their fellow citizens, and they certainly have no intention of modifying the policy of perfect religious equality for all, which now prevails, even though in the future they might become the majority of the citizens. It is a strange fact that, although in the early years of our national life some of the States recognized a particular Protestant church as the established church of the State and restricted the civil rights of Catholics, nowadays Catholics are the only ones ever questioned as to what would happen if they ever gained the balance of power. It would be well for Catholics, when questioned on this point, to ask the questioner what guarantee he can give that his church would not seek special governmental favor and restrict the rights of Catholics if it ever gained sufficient political power to effect such a modification of our American principle of equal religious rights.

FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.SS.R.

Book Reviews

THE NOTION OF TRADITION IN JOHN DRIEDO. By John L. Murphy. Milwaukee: The Seraphic Press, 1959. Pp. xiv + 321. $3.00.

At a time when discussion of tradition and its relationship to Scripture is a focal point of theological investigation, John L. Murphy's study on Driedo is a welcome and important contribution. Marked at once by careful, objective analysis and an interesting, lucid style, this volume (which was written as a doctoral dissertation for the Gregorian University, Rome) solidly establishes the status of its author in the field of serious scholarship.

First of all, the choice of John Driedo as the object of study was a happy one. Professor of theology at the University of Louvain in the period just prior to the Council of Trent, Driedo was aware of the writings of the early Reformers and reacted against them. At the same time, he was a man in basic though prudent sympathy with the thought of the Renaissance. One would suspect *a priori*, therefore, that Driedo's writings merit careful attention as part of the background for the Council of Trent, and specifically for the Council's statements on the subject of tradition. Some Catholic scholars had referred in passing to Driedo and his impact on Trent. Draguet indicated the influence of Driedo on the Tridentine decree concerning Scripture; Lodrioor had essayed a short expose of his notion of tradition in a 1950 article in the *Ephemerides theologicae Lovaniensis*. But until this book by Father Murphy, no one had done a thorough and exact evaluation of Driedo's teaching on tradition. As a result, a fairly important lacuna in our knowledge of the history of the notion of tradition has now been filled.

For the most part, the author draws his own exposition of Driedo's thought from the text of that theologian's *De ecclesiasticis scripturis et dogmatibus*. Driedo's work is not, and was not intended to be, a systematic treatise on tradition and related topics; yet as Father Murphy guides one through an analysis of pertinent passages, the position of Driedo emerges quite clearly and coherently. Really, it is a bit surprising to find in this pre-Tridentine theologian so much of what we might call a "dynamic" understanding of tradition, with considerable emphasis placed on the living teaching role of the Church. In addition, Driedo's writing already contains many of the precisions and distinctions that we tend to associate with later treatments of the

topic of tradition. It makes one wonder if we need not re-examine—and with increased appreciation—the Tridentine and immediately post-Tridentine discussion on the question of tradition.

Regarding the relation between tradition and Scripture, Driedo holds quite a subtle position. One does not notice in his work that separation, even opposition, of these two fonts of Revelation which is found so often in later theological writing. Instead, it would be more accurate to say that Driedo saw a certain coincidence rather than opposition between tradition and Scripture: all revealed truth is contained somehow in the inspired books, yet the process of tradition is necessary for the correct and gradually-unfolding grasp of that truth.

There are a number of features in Father Murphy's treatment that merit special attention: the clear and logical manner in which he presents the content of Driedo's writings; the copious citations from Driedo, particularly valuable because the works of Driedo are not easily available; the excellent summaries that terminate each chapter, and that which terminates the book as a whole. These, plus the overall objectivity of the book, make it a valuable tool for anyone who wishes to know more about the history of the Council of Trent or of the notion of tradition.

BERNARD COOKE, S.J.

COUNSELLING THE CATHOLIC: MODERN TECHNIQUES AND EMOTIONAL CONFLICTS. By George Hagmaier, C.S.P., and Robert W. Gleason, S.J. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 301. $4.50.

Two distinguished Catholic priests, Father George Hagmaier of the Paulists, and Father Robert Gleason of the Jesuits, have collaborated on a book that seems to present an "overview text of pastoral counselling" in admirable fashion. It is especially welcome in a field where non-Catholics have set the pace during recent years.

In clear and unpretentious prose, the authors describe their work as a "simple outline of fundamental counselling concepts and techniques which will serve as a textbook for seminarians and a reference volume for priests." Part One, contributed by Father Hagmaier, treats the "psychological perspectives of counselling," while the second Part, contributed by Father Gleason, handles the "moral perspectives." One appendix attempts the difficult task of describing some of the chief forms of mental illness, while the second offers a list of the national referral facilities which are available to the pastoral counselor.

Father Hagmaier presents fine chapters on "Emotions and Behavior," "The Priest As a Listener," "The Psychology of Human

Weakness" and then separate considerations of masturbation, homosexuality, scrupulosity, and alcoholism. It would be hard to compliment Father Hagmaier enough on his simple, direct, and sound discussions of these areas. His is the wisdom of a professional who has obviously had a wide range of experience in psychological counselling. While warning his readers that many of the subjects are "by no means as obvious and simple as they might appear," he aims at effecting an attitudinal change on the part of priests "about the problem-solving process itself." This is surely the most laudable of aims, the unitary objective that should lead readers to be more conscious of their own role in helping people and less pre-occupied with relieving symptoms and "solving" the superficial aspects of human problems. This orientation deserves considerable reflection, especially by those concerned with training future priests. There is a deceptive simplicity in the statement that the learning counselor "must be helped to recognize within himself the emotional influences described." In all counselor-training deep self-knowledge is the necessary foundation for growth in helping other people effectively. One fears that this will be the message that will be ignored by the counselor "who is looking for someone to help," and who may often be answering his own rather than the needs of others.

Father Gleason's treatment is equally professional. It is more familiar territory for the priest or seminarian who may use this book. Father Gleason has the detached and open attitude of the real scholar. The question of the compatibility of psychology and religion has been stated before and one wonders whether it is needed in a book which in itself testifies eloquently to the lack of conflict.

The interested reader will perhaps be encouraged to look more deeply into contemporary counselling theory and will try to avail himself of some supervised training in this area. The authors make clear that this is not a "how to do it" book and it would be regrettable if it were so perceived. It deserves many reflective readers.

EUGENE C. KENNEDY, M.M.

DE MATRIMONIO RATO ET NON CONSUMMATO, Dispensationis Processus Canonici Doctrina et Praxis. By Josephus Casoria. Romae: Officium Libri Catholici, 1959. Pp. xxii + 404. No price given.

This work represents a major endeavor to treat comprehensively the doctrinal and canonico-juridic principles and procedural practice

in respect to dispensation in ratified non-consummated marriage. In regard to this all-inclusive scope, the volume is unique.

The work is divided into two parts, besides a series of Appendices. The first part (to p. 85), after a general, brief introduction on the status of indissolubility of matrimony, treats the doctrinal aspect of the papal dispensation. The section in question embraces less than a third of the author's entire actual treatise (to p. 233). The second part deals with the rules of procedure, the well-known *Regulae Servandae in Processibus super Matrimonio Rato et Non Consummato* of the S. Congr. of the Sacraments, dated May 7, 1923. The Appendices are seven in number (pp. 237-399). A careful page-for-page perusal of the entire volume permits the following comments.

The *Pars Prima* includes a documented presentation of the doctrines respecting the relation of matrimonial consent to the status of marriage —the copular and consensual theories of matrimony, and a review of the historical doctrines, canonical and theological, concerning the dispensation in question. There follows a treatment of some juridic concepts and aspects of matrimony and of dispensation. The nature of the dispensation and of the power of dispensing in a merely ratified marriage is discussed at length. In respect to the Decree, *Catholica doctrina,* introducing the *Regulae,* the *Pars Prima* confines itself to a consideration of the power of the Roman Pontiff. It could well have treated, with appropriate, formal commentary, the juridic principles contained in this important document of the highest practical significance, precision, and clarity. They form the actual basis of the Rules. The *Pars Prima* closes with a brief inquiry into the scope of papal authority to dispense in the bond of matrimony which is not *ratum et consummatum.* In respect to this particular feature, it is somewhat strange to read the author as simply proposing that in theory there is nothing to impede *(nihil vetat, theoretice loquendo)* extension of papal authority to merely *legitimum* consummated marriage entered into with dispensation from disparity of worship—the *Monterey-Fresno Cases!* The first part of this work has its instructive value on a theoretic doctrinal level. As regards Chancery practice, it contains nothing which is not already known.

The *Pars Altera,* the second part, of this work begins by pointing out, with some observations, the principal papal documents according to which the process *super rato* is conducted. The pertinent documents are contained in the Appendices. An informative review is given on procedures in extraordinary circumstances, and concerning the position of the S. Roman Rota.

The second part professes to be a commentary on the *Regulae*, as such. Unfortunately, the achievement of this purpose is not uniformly successful. The discourse on the preliminary investigations after the filing of the petition is well done. Other such instances may be found, such as the considerations respecting the testimony of the *septimae manus* witnesses, and regarding documents. There is, however, as a rule, no incisive, analytic inquiry from a properly procedural aspect into the meaning, practical significance and application of the *Regulae* as individual provisions. Hence as a commentary on the procedural matters and phases of the Rules the work at hand can not lay claim to superiority.

The numerical order of the Rules is not followed. They are discussed principally from the vantage point of the headnotes, in the order of the *Capita* of the *Regulae Servandae*. The observations of the text are, consequently, directed to the subject of the headnote, attention being given to the various, related aspects of the Rules which the particular topic embraces. The result is an explanation of the chapter headnotes, rather than a commentary on the Rules themselves. This type of treatment is instructive. It has its value for the graduate student or for one who is not familiar with this area of canon law. It discloses to the reader the proper coordination of the Rules. But for the expert and the practitioner in this field the presentation in not a few places is light reading. Accordingly, one can note the omission of many considerations of procedural details and refinements of practical moment, which are passed by unnoticed, but which do occur in the course of the actual application of the various Rules. The exposition in this area lacks good order. Attention to Rules referable to the same subject matter is found dispersed in a number of places throughout the work. There is no index of Rules; and no topical index.

The topical method of approach serves the author most appropriately and successfully in respect to the subject matters which primarily do not have procedural import, but are rather substantive in nature. In these areas the author's presentations are unquestionably worthy of close attention and study. To this class of subjects belong the medico-legal discourses on physical virginity, on the practical value and necessity of the physical examination of the female, on the selection of experts, on the concept of consummation, and the disquisition on the just causes for dispensation. These considerations are sufficiently well annotated. The items of information on the procedure at the Roman Curia preparatory to the decision in this type of case are instructive and practical, as are the observations on the

official prohibition *(vetitum)* in regard to future marriage. Some special questions are entertained toward the close of the treatise. At least some of this material could more properly have been included with previous discussions.

The bibliography is adequate. The seven Appendices contain pertinent primary documentary materials. There is a table of contents. The author, who is well qualified to write on this subject, may be congratulated upon his extensive effort.

JOHN ROGG SCHMIDT

THE LIFE OF BENEDICT XV. By Walter H. Peters. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1959. Pp. x + 321. $4.50.

Substantially Father Peters has produced an interesting and highly valuable biography. The book is scholarly, yet very easy to read. It gives valuable information about the activities of the Holy See during the years of the First World War. Much of the material is not otherwise easily accessible to the ordinary reader today.

Unfortunately one chapter of the book is definitely objectionable. The fifth chapter, on "Modernists and Integralists," picks up and repeats the Modernistic calumnies against Monsignor Benigni. It is to be hoped that in future editions of *The Life of Benedict XV* this chapter will be completely and radically revised.

JOSEPH CLIFFORD FENTON

THE INFANT OF PRAGUE. By Ludvick Nemec. New York: Benziger, 1959. Pp. xv + 304. $5.95.

This work by Father Nemec is the first sound scholarly work on the history of the statue of the Holy Child, brought from Spain in the sixteenth century to Prague, the capital of Bohemia (now Czechoslovakia). It discusses the world-wide scope of the devotion to the Little King that it represents, and offers a clear, simple explanation of the theological basis for the devotion.

This particular image—only eighteen inches high—was enshrined in the Carmelite Church of Our Lady of Victory in Prague, and has served as a model for countless other reproductions, distributed and honored all over the world. About 120 pages of this book are concerned with the world-wide shrines of the Infant of Prague, and with the innumerable favors, graces and miracles in both the material and the spiritual order that are attributed to this devotion.

The statue of the Holy Child of Prague was occasionally neglected, and once, when the Protestants captured Prague, the statue was partially broken and discarded in a scrap heap behind the altar. It was forgotten for seven years, and sufferings and hardships befell the citizens; when it was recovered and restored to its place of honor, graces and blessings flowed once more in abundance.

Many Popes have blessed and approved devotion to the Infant of Prague. Pope Gregory XIV, in 1743, granted a plenary indulgence to all who venerate the Infant during the days of the annual novena. Pope Clement XIII issued the decree of 1761 bestowing the *Altare Privilegiatum* to the altar in the chapel of the Infant of Prague. On May 18, 1900, Pope Leo XIII granted special indulgences to devotions attended in the chapel in Brussels. The Confraternity of the Infant Jesus of Prague was founded in 1895. Pope St. Pius X unified the existing sodalities under one set of rules on March 13, 1913. Pope Pius XI in 1923 decided that the sodality should be under the exclusive supervision of the Discalced Carmelites, the original custodians of the Prague Shrine.

Great saints have practiced and spread the devotion. Today even behind the Iron Curtain, reliable sources of information report that devotion to the Infant Jesus of Prague is practiced among ever-increasing numbers of the faithful; the Church of Our Lady of Victory is filled with devotees most of the time. This irks the Communists, but they dare not interfere with the devotion for fear of popular reaction.

Father Nemec gives the theological basis for devotion to the Child King, based on Holy Scripture and the Fathers. The littleness of childhood combined with the greatness of sovereignty was a part of the revelation of St. John (*Apoc.*, 19:16). The Child of Bethlehem and the Boy of Nazareth was from His infancy true God and true Man, King of heaven and earth. The Kingship of the Divine Child, "glory hidden in humility," teaches men humility, confidence, and simplicity; it gives special grace to those who surrender themselves to his teaching and guidance.

A valuable appendix of original prayers, papal grants, plenary indulgences, perpetual faculties, and pastoral letters completes the work; there are eighteen pages of footnotes, thirteen pages of bibliography, with an index of equal length—all giving evidence of the painstaking scholarship which makes this book a treasure-house of information and inspiration.

The Infant of Prague is a book which gives promise of becoming a best seller in the field of religious literature; it deserves to be the

top choice of at least a half dozen Book of the Month Clubs. Every literate Catholic would derive great benefit from reading it; the volume is beautifully written and attractively printed. The only fly in the ointment is the price, but it is worth every cent of it and more.

ROBERT J. SHERRY

THE EUCHARIST AND CHRISTIAN LIFE. By the late Isidor Cardinal Goma. Adapted by Aloysius J. Willinger, C.SS.R., Fresno, California: Academy Library Guild, 1958. Pp. 214. $2.00.

This is the second in a series on the Eucharist, and it takes up the relation between the Eucharist and the virtues of Faith and Charity. As Bishop Willinger points out in the introduction, "it is not a translation in the strict sense of the word. Many parts of the original have been omitted and new ideas inserted for reasons of clarification or mere opportuneness." As you read through the book you have no idea that it is a translation or adaptation, in fact the English is very polished and relatively easy to read considering the involved subject matter.

Of the six chapters, three are devoted to the Eucharist and the intellect, exploring the relationship between this Sacrament and the supernatural virtue of Faith, and the other three concern the will and the Supernatural virtue of Charity.

This book is a thorough study of the relationship between the Eucharist and these two theological virtues. It is replete with texts from Scripture, and from the fathers and doctors of the church. It can supply excellent material for meditation, or it can help you prepare your sermons on this most important topic. Some might consider it a little heavy for spiritual reading, whereas others might like it very much. In any case, there is plenty of material here.

RAYMOND FAVRET

Books Received

THE BOOK OF GENESIS. PART II WITH A COMMENTARY. By Ignatius Hunt, O.S.B. New York: The Paulist Press, 1960. Pp. 96 75¢. This is Volume 3 of the Pamphlet Bible Series.

THE CHURCH AND THE NATIONS. A STUDY OF MINORITY CATHOLICISM IN ENGLAND, INDIA, NORWAY, AMERICA, LEBANON, AUSTRALIA, WALES, JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS, VIETNAM, BRAZIL, EGYPT, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND AMONG THE LELE OF THE CONGO. Edited by Adrian Hastings. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959. Pp. xxii + 238. $4.75.

UNCONQUERABLES. By Joseph Pauco. Translated from the Slovak by Andrew Bachleda. New York: Vantage Press, 1958. Pp. 225. $3.50.

ECUMENICAL COUNCILS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AN HISTORICAL OUTLINE. By Hubert Jedin. Translated by Ernest Graf, O.S.B. New York: Herder and Herder, 1960. Pp. 254. $3.95.

ENCHIRIDION PATRISTICUM. LOCI SS. PATRUM, DOCTORUM, SCRIPTORUM ECCLESIASTICORUM. By M. J. Rouët de Journel, S.J. Twenty-First edition, with a new appendix added. Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1959. Pp. xxvii + 818. Paper bound, $3.95. Cloth bound, $5.25.

DE FIDELIUM ASSOCIATIONIBUS TRACTUS RATIONE ET USU DIGESTUS. By Serafino de Angelis. Naples, Italy: M. d'Auria, 1959. Pp. xxxii + 342; xx + 493. Paper bound, $9.65. Cloth bound, $11.62.

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PROVINCE OF THE SOCIETY OF THE PRECIOUS BLOOD. Volume I, Origins in Europe. By Paul J. Knapke, C.PP.S. Carthagena, Ohio: The Messenger Press, 1958. Pp. xi + 251. $5.00.

FREE SPEECH IN THE CHURCH. By Karl Rahner, S.J. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959. Pp. 112. $2.75.

THE IDEA OF REFORM. ITS IMPACT ON CHRISTIAN THOUGHT AND ACTION IN THE AGE OF THE FATHERS. By Gerhart B. Ladner. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. Pp. xiii + 553. $10.00.

JOHN KEBLE'S LITERARY AND RELIGIOUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE OXFORD MOVEMENT. By W. J. A. M. Beek. Nijmegen, Holland: Centrale Drukkerij, 1959. Pp. xv + 192. No price given.

SAINT IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA. By Giorgio Papasogli. Translated from the Italian by Paul Garvin. New York: Society of St. Paul, 1959. Pp. 351. $4.00.

ERASMUS AND HIS TIMES. By Louis Bouyer, Cong. Orat. Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1959. Pp. 220. $3.75.

PRIEST OF CHRIST. By Francis J. Ripley. Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1959. Pp. 198. $3.95.

THE BENEDICTINE IDEA. By Dom Hubert van Zeller. Springfield, Illinois: Templegate, 1959. Pp. xii + 237. $3.95.

APPROACH TO MONASTICISM. By Dom Hubert van Zeller. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960. Pp. viii + 182. $3.00.

CITIES IN CRISIS. THE CHRISTIAN RESPONSE. By Dennis Clark. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960. Pp. x + 177. $3.50.

THE MASS. A LITURGICAL COMMENTARY. By A. Croegaert. Vol. II. The Mass of the Faithful. Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1959. Pp. x + 311. $4.75.

MOTHER OF THE REDEEMER. ASPECTS OF DOCTRINE AND DEVOTION. Lectures of Maynooth Union Summer School. Edited by Kevin McNamara. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960. Pp. xiii + 258. $4.00.

ELEMENTS OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. By Etienne Gilson. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960. Pp. 358. $5.50.

ADAM, EVE, AND THE APE. By Louis de Wohl. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960, Pp. 118. $2.75.

SACRAMENTAL PRAYER. By Conrad Pepler, O.P. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1959. Pp. viii + 148. $2.75.

THE QUEST FOR GOD. A STUDY IN BENEDICTINE SPIRITUALITY. By Dom I. Ryelandt. Translated from the French by Dom Matthew Dillon. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1959. Pp. 207. $3.25.

THE MASS IN MEDITATION. By Theodor Schnitzler. Translated by Msgr. Rudolph Kraus. Vol. II. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1960. Pp. ix + 317. $4.50.

LE CHRIST DANS LE QUARTIER. POUR UN RENOUVEAU DE LA PAROISSE. By Bishop Émile-joseph De Smedt. Bruges: Desclée De Brouwer, 1960. Pp. 134. 69 Belgian Francs.

SLAVERY AND FREEDOMS By Nicolas Berdyaev. Translated from the Russian by R. M. French. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, Pp. 268. $1.45.

I AND THOU. By Martin Buber. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. Second Edition, with a postscript by the author added. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. Pp. xii + 137. $1.25.

THE FRANCISCANS. ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI AND HIS THREE ORDERS. By Alexandre Masseron and Marion A. Habig, O.F.M. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1959. Pp. xxi + 518. $5.95.

APPARITIONS OF OUR LADY. THEIR PLACE IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH. By Louis Lochet. New York: Herder and Herder, 1960. Pp. ix + 127. $2.95.

THE LITANY OF OUR LADY. By Patrick J. Gearon, O.Carm. Chicago: The Carmelite Third Order Press, 1959. Pp. 237. $2.50.

THE WATCHMAN. By C. Edward Hopkin. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1960. Pp. x + 117. No price given.

THE GENERAL COUNCILS OF THE CHURCH. By John L. Murphy. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1960. Pp. xii + 193. $3.50.